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Executive Summary
In 1972, Congress adopted the modern Clean Water Act (CWA), establishing federal, 
uniform standards for protecting the nation’s waterways.  The law established a process for 
limiting polluting emissions, under which state and federal environmental agencies grant 
permits to polluters based on local waterways’ uses and pollution loads.  Just as important, 
the law created a mechanism for federal and state enforcement of  those permits.
Significantly, the CWA allows the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to delegate 
permitting and enforcement to state environmental agencies, and by virtue of  such 
delegation, the Maryland of  Department of  the Environment (MDE) enforces federal 
water pollution standards in the state.  This report evaluates MDE’s enforcement of  the 
CWA and offers solutions to improve and reinvigorate the program.  Those conclusions 
and recommendations are based on research that draws on publicly available information, 
including MDE’s Annual Enforcement and Compliance Reports; a review of  scholarly 
research on effective enforcement program design; and a series of  interviews conducted with 
stakeholders across the state and a meeting with MDE enforcement staff.
Findings
The report draws three significant conclusions:
Funding.  1. MDE is drastically underfunded.  For example, the overall workforce 
budget for the Water Management Administration (WMA) between 2000 and 2009 
declined from $3.39 million to $3.16 million.  When adjusted for inflation, this 
decline is nearly 25 percent and coincides with a doubling of  permits-in-effect.  As a 
result, the agency does not have enough resources to effectively fulfill the core mis-
sion of  the CWA and state water quality laws.  The funding shortages are especially 
pronounced with respect to the enforcement workforce and the number of  inspec-
tions.  The total number of  WMA inspector positions, including both filled and 
vacant positions, has decreased by 12 percent, while the number of  active, full-time 
inspectors has decreased by 25 percent.  Each inspector in the WMA is responsible 
for 1,184 permits as of  2009, triple the number of  permits per inspector in 2000.  
Funding shortages also dramatically curtail the ability of  MDE’s legal counsel to 
pursue and effectively litigate enforcement actions.  Nearly 40 percent of  MDE’s 
referrals for legal action from 2009—325 of  816 cases—are still awaiting action by 
the Office of  the Maryland Attorney General (OAG).  While these attorneys report 
to the Attorney General, their positions are located within MDE’s budget.
Program Design. 2.  Regardless of  funding shortfalls, MDE has not designed its 
enforcement program to effectively deter dischargers from violating the CWA 
and state water quality laws.  MDE relies primarily on paper reviews of  Discharge 
Monitoring Reports (DMRs) to assess compliance, overlooking the importance of  
physical, onsite inspections that may reveal violations or problems not disclosed in 
such reports.  Across the board, MDE has settled for strikingly low penalties, and its 
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penalty policy fails to recover the violator’s economic benefit from noncompliance.  
Between 2000 and 2009, the average penalty that the WMA obtained per enforce-
ment action for all its water permitting programs is approximately $1,260, around 5 
percent of  the maximum penalty per day authorized under 
the CWA, as enacted, and 12.6 percent of  the maximum 
penalty authorized per day under Maryland law.  MDE also 
fails to fully disclose the range of  enforcement actions taken 
by local programs with delegated enforcement authority, 
resulting in an incomplete picture of  enforcement activities 
across the state. 
Citizen Suits. 3.  MDE fails to take advantage of  citizen suits 
to supplement its own enforcement actions and to maxi-
mize its limited resources.  MDE’s institutional mentality 
precludes citizen suits from proceeding by preempting these 
lawsuits and denying citizens the opportunity to participate 
or to represent their own interests once MDE takes over the 
case.  According to some environmental interviewees and 
officials, this attitude toward citizen suits has provoked an 
atmosphere of  tension and controversy among MDE staff  
and the regulated community, as they question the validity 
of  this supplementary enforcement tool provided by Con-
gress to give citizens access to the courts and to assist state 
enforcement programs.
Ultimately, because MDE is starved for resources and has persisted 
in carrying out an inadequately designed program, its CWA 
enforcement program is ineffective at deterring noncompliance 
across the spectrum of  regulated sectors.  In fact, funding gaps have 
persisted for so long that, according to many we interviewed, MDE’s 
staff  has internalized an unacceptably low level of  expectations 
for the agency’s performance in enforcement.  For example, MDE 
relies primarily on paper inspections of  self-monitoring reports 
to determine compliance.  Few, if  any, credible experts in the 
operation of  a deterrence-based enforcement program, whether 
in the government, the private sector, or among publicly-funded 
organizations, would agree that paper inspections provide the 
foundation for an effective enforcement program.  Another example 
is the backlog of  case referrals awaiting assignment in the OAG, 
indicating that even MDE’s weak efforts to verify compliance and 
implement an effective deterrence-based enforcement program are 
crippled by lack of  legal representation.
FiGURE 1:  Pollution Contribution  
to the Bay by Sector
niTRoGEn
PHoSPHoRUS
SEDiMEnT
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Stakeholder interviews
As part of  their research for this report, the authors conducted a series of  interviews with 
key stakeholders with varied and considerable experience in CWA enforcement to determine 
how they perceive MDE’s enforcement program and to help identify the program’s 
strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in enforcement.  The authors requested interviews with 20 
stakeholders, who together represent a diverse group of  current and former federal, state, 
and local government officials; members of  the regulated community; and members of  
public interest groups.  The findings are drawn from interviews with the 16 stakeholders 
who agreed to participate.   
In general terms, interviewees reached a consensus on the resource limitations that plague 
MDE’s enforcement program and the OAG’s ability to pursue cases referred to it by MDE.  
They also agreed generally that criminal enforcement could be increased for particularly 
willful and egregious violations when a criminal law is clearly violated.  Interviewees 
disagreed on many other issues, however, including the institutional and permitting aspects 
of  MDE’s enforcement program, the nature of  MDE’s enforcement approach and actions, 
the role and effectiveness of  citizen suits in enforcement, and the role of  EPA.
Themes emerging from the interviews included:
Evaluations of  MDE’s enforcement program revealed it was weak for four •	
reasons: resource limitations on enforcement; institutional limitations on enforce-
ment; weaknesses in the permitting program; and the nature of  enforcement actions 
taken by MDE.
Nearly	all	interviewees	lamented	the	lack	of 	financial	resources	available	to	•	
MDE	and	appreciated	the	challenge	faced	by	MDE	staff 	being	asked	to	do	
more with less money.  One industry interviewee pointed out a basic dilemma:  
Maryland “can’t keep diverting resources and adding more statutory requirements 
and expect things to improve.”  
All	interviewees	agreed	that	MDE	should	be	the	primary	enforcer	for	viola-•	
tions of  Clean Water Act requirements in Maryland with citizen suits and EPA 
taking a secondary role, if  any.  
Nearly all interviewees expressed dismay at the lack of  inspectors and the •	
lack of  inspections in MDE’s enforcement program and cited a need to in-
crease	both.  At least two industry interviewees suggested MDE should hire more 
inspectors to catch such errors and to identify specific violations, rather than relying 
on enforcement efforts that overreach because MDE lacks the inspectors to review 
each entity. 
Some	officials	and	environmental	interviewees	lamented	the	low	penalties	as-•	
sessed	by	MDE	and	their	negligible	impact	on	deterrence.
Interviewees expressed divergent views on the role of  citizen suits in enforce-•	
ment.  All environmental interviewees and some officials expressed the view that 
citizen suits are a critical tool in enforcing the law and that they help drive MDE’s 
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enforcement.  They favored a larger role for citizen suits as a supplement to MDE’s 
work and to leverage resources and characterized MDE’s attitude toward citizen 
suits as unfavorable, if  not outright hostile.  Interviewees attributed this attitude to 
insecurity, embarrassment, and favoritism toward the regulated community.  In-
dustry interviewees and some officials, on the other hand, were less approving of  
citizen suits, characterizing them as “witch hunts” and finding that the suits impact 
the timing of  MDE enforcement, but not the outcome of  that enforcement. 
Industry interviewees characterized MDE’s enforcement as heavy-handed, •	
inconsistent, and disproportionate.  In their opinion, most violations occur be-
cause the regulated community is unaware or ignorant of  the regulations.  They said 
that MDE should provide more education and outreach and rely on more coopera-
tive actions to reduce violations. 
Interviewees had different and contrasting opinions on MDE’s relationships •	
with	the	regulated	community	and	with	public	interest	groups	and	their	
impacts on enforcement.  Both industry and environmental interviewees 
expressed suspicion that MDE favors the other side.  Both environmental and 
industry interviewees recommended a more inclusive decision-making process. 
Nearly every interviewee thought that MDE and the OAG should pursue •	
criminal	enforcement	actions	for	willful	or	flagrant	violations.  Opinions as 
to the effectiveness of  criminal enforcement actions in achieving deterrence var-
ied.  Some interviewees said that more criminal actions would send a clear message.  
Others had difficulty evaluating the deterrent effect when cases are so difficult to 
establish and civil penalties are much higher than they are in criminal cases. 
Environmental	interviewees	and	some	officials	attributed	some	enforcement	•	
problems	to	the	OAG,	citing	a	lack	of 	resources.		Some interviewees cited the 
need for greater OAG review of  permits before they are issued. 
Key Recommendations
This report concludes that while Maryland has tough environmental laws, MDE lacks 
the funding and does not currently have an adequate enforcement program to achieve 
the goals set under the CWA and its own state laws.  However, even without additional 
funding, it could redesign its existing program and reallocate its limited resources to improve 
enforcement of  water quality laws.  The authors offer the following recommendations: 
n increase Funding.  Drastically underfunded, MDE does not have enough resources to 
effectively fulfill the core mission of  the CWA and state water quality laws.  The funding 
shortages are especially pronounced with respect to the enforcement workforce, which limits 
how many inspections the agency is able to conduct.  Both the regulated community and 
environmental groups agree that MDE is overwhelmed with work and has limited resources 
available to effectively enforce the law; they also agree that more inspectors are necessary to 
develop a steady, judicious, systematic, and fair enforcement program.  Going forward:
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The Maryland General Assembly should provide additional funding to ensure a • 
vigorous enforcement program and should index increased funding levels to the rate 
of  inflation.
The Maryland General Assembly should authorize an increase in permitting fees to • 
ensure that the fees cover the basic cost of  program administration.  
The Maryland General Assembly should authorize increased penalties for violations • 
and should establish mandatory minimum penalties that are not subject to MDE 
discretion.
n Revise Program Design.  Regardless of  funding shortfalls, MDE has not designed its 
enforcement program to effectively deter dischargers from violating the CWA and state 
water quality laws.  Going forward:
In its penalty structure, MDE should seek to recoup the economic benefit achieved • 
by noncompliance from all defendants in enforcement actions.
MDE should stop relying primarily on paper reviews of  permit-holders’ DMRs to • 
set enforcement priorities and should increase the frequency of  physical, on-site 
inspections.
MDE should reevaluate the balance of  judicial enforcement actions and administra-• 
tive enforcement actions and carefully consider which route is better, based on fac-
tors such as the difference in maximum available penalties or past experience with 
similar cases or in similar venues.  
MDE should conduct an analysis of  the most significant causes of  Bay pollution • 
and select and inspect on an annual basis the largest dischargers or a random sample 
of  discharges in sectors with multiple small dischargers.  
n Embrace Citizen Suits.  MDE fails to take advantage of  citizen suits to supplement its 
own enforcement actions and to maximize its limited resources.  MDE often blocks citizen 
suits by initiating enforcement action that preempts these lawsuits, and denies citizens the 
opportunity to participate or to represent their own interests once MDE takes over the case.  
On a case-by-case basis, MDE should permit citizen suits to proceed in federal court • 
to supplement its own enforcement.  Allowing enforcement actions to proceed in 
federal courts would facilitate maximum penalty recovery and thus create maximum 
deterrent effect.  
Conclusion
The cost of  MDE’s enforcement failures is very high for Marylanders, not just because the 
Chesapeake Bay is so much a part of  the state’s identity or because it is so widely used for 
recreation, but because it is central to the health of  the state’s economy.  Maryland is not the 
only the state that pollutes the Bay, of  course, and it is not the only jurisdiction that enforces 
water quality standards affecting the Bay.  But in order to achieve the goal of  restoring the 
health of  the Bay, Maryland must do its part.  MDE must forcefully and publicly renew its 
commitment to enforcement.    
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Project Goals and Methodology
In December 2009, The Abell Foundation commissioned the Center for Progressive 
Reform (CPR) to investigate the effectiveness of  the Maryland Department of  the 
Environment’s (MDE) Clean Water Act (CWA) enforcement program.  This report on 
that investigation takes a detailed look at whether MDE’s efforts to enforce the CWA, in 
conjunction with the Office of  the Maryland Attorney General (OAG), and its response 
to citizen enforcement initiatives, have contributed to the CWA’s goal of  enhancing 
and protecting water quality in the manner envisioned by Congress.  Over a 15-week 
period, CPR investigated MDE’s enforcement record with respect to major sources 
of  pollution to the Chesapeake Bay:  sewage treatment plants, industrial and municipal 
facilities, constructions sites, and concentrated animal feeding operations.  This report 
identifies a series of  recommendations to revitalize and reinvigorate enforcement of  CWA 
requirements in Maryland.  
The research for this report was compiled and co-authored by CPR Member Scholar 
Robert Glicksman, the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of  Environmental Law at the 
George Washington University School of  Law in Washington, D.C., and Yee Huang, CPR 
Policy Analyst.  Professor Glicksman is a nationally recognized expert in Clean Water Act 
enforcement.  He has recently co-authored Pollution Limits and Polluters’ Efforts to Comply:  The 
Role of  Government Monitoring and Enforcement (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2010), a 
detailed examination of  nationwide Clean Water Act enforcement. 
The authors relied on three methods to gather the information reported here:  publicly 
available online sources and reports; a review of  scholarly literature on enforcement 
mechanisms, effectiveness, and design; and interviews with 16 key stakeholders in Maryland. 
The authors sent MDE a draft copy of  this report and met with several members of  the 
enforcement staff.  MDE’s response is included as appendix A, (see page 58).
The enforcement statistics and other data contained in this report are drawn from MDE’s 
Annual Enforcement and Compliance Reports from FY 2000 to FY 2009.  Other sources 
used and available online include:  reports from the Maryland Office of  Legislative Audits, 
the federal Government Accountability Office, and the Congressional Research Service, as 
well as Keeping Pace:  Maryland’s Most Important Environmental Problems and What We Can Do to 
Solve Them, a 2002 report by the University of  Maryland Environmental Law Clinic, and the 
2007 Maryland Transition Work Group Report on Environment and Natural Resources.  
To better understand how MDE’s enforcement program operates on the ground, CPR 
conducted a series of  interviews with stakeholders across Maryland.  Interview participants 
were asked to respond to a series of  open-ended and general questions about the 
enforcement of  Clean Water Act requirements in Maryland, particularly with respect to 
efforts to restore the Chesapeake Bay.  To encourage a candid dialogue, participants were 
informed that their specific statements during the interview would remain confidential but 
that the list of  interviewees would be made public.  That list is included in the Interview 
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Findings section.  The authors made every effort to consult a balanced and diverse group 
of  stakeholders in order to ensure that the perspectives of  state and local governments, 
regulated industries, and public interest groups were fully represented, and the authors 
believe they achieved this fundamental goal.  
Ultimately, because MDE is starved for resources and has persisted in carrying out an 
inadequately designed program, its CWA enforcement program is ineffective in creating the 
appropriate level of  deterrence against noncompliance by the full range of  regulated entities.  
Funding gaps have persisted for so long that, according to many interviewees, MDE’s 
staff  has internalized an unacceptably low series of  expectations for their performance in 
enforcement by, for example, primarily relying on paper inspections of  self-monitoring 
reports to determine compliance.  Few, if  any, credible experts in the operation of  a 
deterrence-based enforcement program, whether in the government, the private sector, 
or among publicly-funded organizations, would agree that primary reliance on paper 
inspections results in an effective enforcement program.  As troubling, a backlog of  325 case 
referrals awaiting assignment in OAG indicates that even MDE’s unacceptably weak efforts 
to verify compliance and implement an effective deterrence-based enforcement program are 
crippled by lack of  legal representation.
Given gaps in existing record-keeping, it is difficult to assess in any reliable, quantitative 
manner how these dramatic weaknesses in the enforcement program translate into pollution 
in the Chesapeake Bay.  However, all Maryland stakeholders concerned about restoring 
the Bay to the point where it is once again a vibrant, healthy, and internationally renowned 
natural resource would do well to put inadequate enforcement of  existing law at the top of  
their list of  priorities for reform.  Stakeholders interviewed generally concluded that MDE 
is in the “middle of  the pack” of  states in the Bay region where enforcement is concerned.  
If  these perceptions are correct, the state can do better.  It is critically important to the 
health of  state residents and the quality of  the environment that the political leadership 
in Maryland and at MDE commit to taking the steps that will allow it to lead the region in 
CWA enforcement efforts. 
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Maryland’s Waters:  An overview  
Maryland has more than 7,000 miles of  coastline and thousands 
of  stream and river miles and lake acres, and the Chesapeake Bay 
is the crown jewel of  Maryland’s natural resource heritage.  Nearly 
the entire state lies within the Bay’s watershed.  The Bay provides 
a rich source of  economic and aesthetic wealth for the state 
from fishing, tourism, and recreation.  Unfortunately, because of  
pollution, the health of  the Bay is tenuous—improved from its 
condition in the 1980s, but still far short of  what Bay scientists 
consider healthy.  The primary pollutants in the Bay are nitrogen, 
phosphorous, and sediment.  In appropriate quantities, nitrogen 
and phosphorous are beneficial nutrients.  In excess, however, 
these nutrients accumulate in the Bay and contribute to algal 
blooms and dead zones during the summer months.  
Agriculture is the largest source of  each pollutant, contributing 
38 percent of  the nitrogen, 45 percent of  the phosphorous, 
and 60 percent of  the sediment to the Bay.  Agriculture makes 
up 25 percent of  the land use in the watershed, and pollution 
from agricultural runoff  is often the least expensive to reduce.  
Unfortunately, regulation of  agricultural runoff  is inconsistent, 
and much of  it escapes regulation under either federal or state 
water pollution control laws.  
Runoff  from the urban and suburban sectors is another 
major contributor of  pollutants to the Bay and is particularly 
troublesome because it is the only increasing source of  pollution.  
As land is urbanized and converted to asphalt or concrete 
surfaces, and as construction sites alter the topography, the natural 
surfaces lose the ability to absorb water naturally through the ground.  These impervious 
surfaces channel concentrate water flow, washing contaminants, including sediment and oil 
and gas residue from roads, into local waterways, especially during heavy rains.  During the 
1990s, the population in the Bay increased by 8 percent, while the impervious surface in the 
Bay watershed increased disproportionately, by 40 percent.  As the population continues to 
grow, impervious surface area will only increase, highlighting the importance of  wet weather 
water quality control.
Maryland contributes approximately 20 percent of  the nitrogen and phosphorus pollution 
in the Bay.  Because Maryland has a long cultural and economic history of  benefitting from 
some of  the most scenic and bountiful segments of  the Chesapeake Bay, it has always 
acknowledged a deep stake in the process of  restoring contaminated and degraded resources. 
A 2004 estimate by the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Blue Ribbon Finance Panel estimated the 
FiGURE 2:  nitrogen Loadings by State
FiGURE 3:  Phosphorus Loadings by State
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economic value of  the Bay to over $1 trillion annually.  The state 
has passed a series of  laws intended to strengthen restoration 
efforts, including the Chesapeake Bay Restoration Act and 
the Maryland Healthy Air Act.  Despite these efforts, and the 
expenditure of  billions of  dollars in federal aid over the past 
20 years, water quality and the health of  precious ecosystems, 
including fishing resources, within the Bay have not improved 
during this period.  The Chesapeake Bay Program, a consortium 
of  the Bay Watershed states, has missed high-profile deadlines 
for lowering pollution in the Bay and restoring natural resources, 
especially with respect to nutrient loading.  Restoration of  the 
Chesapeake Bay requires a strong, committed enforcement 
program in Maryland and in all Bay states. 
 
FiGURE 4:  Sources of nitrogen in Maryland
FiGURE 5:  Sources of Phosphorus in Maryland
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The Clean Water Act:  Enforcement Structure 
Government Enforcement:  Two Approaches
The 1972 Clean Water Act (CWA) fundamentally restructured the legal mechanisms for 
protecting the nation’s waters.  It established a water pollution control strategy based on the 
premise that prohibiting the discharge of  pollutants without a permit that imposes stringent 
controls on polluting sources is the best way to improve water quality.  The heart of  the CWA’s 
implementation and enforcement strategy is the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) program.  All point sources—specific, identifiable sources of  pollution—
must obtain a NPDES permit and comply with the limits on discharges (called effluent limits) 
that it sets.  Those limits are based on both the source’s capability to reduce its discharges 
using the best available pollution control technology and supplemental controls needed to 
achieve levels of  water quality that protect the public health and welfare and enhance water 
quality.  Each NPDES permit specifies the frequency with which permit holders must submit 
Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs), or the results from self-monitoring. 
By law, EPA may delegate to states the authority to administer the NPDES permit program 
if  the state establishes a program that satisfies the minimal requirements established in the 
CWA.  EPA may also withdraw that delegation of  authority if  a state fails to administer the 
program in compliance with CWA requirements.  If  EPA withdraws authority for a state 
program, it must administer a federal permit program in the affected state. 
The adoption of  environmental quality laws, of  course, does not of  itself  protect the 
nation’s waters.  Achievement of  statutory environmental protection goals depends on 
rigorous enforcement.  The CWA establishes two primary enforcement mechanisms:  
Civil	and	criminal	enforcement	actions	by	the	government1. , either EPA or a 
state with delegated authority; and
Civil	enforcement	actions	by	citizens	acting	as	private	attorneys	general2.  to 
supplement governmental enforcement initiatives.  
At the time the CWA was passed, Congress recognized that even the best designed and 
most well-intentioned enforcement programs could not and would not catch all violations.  
Resource limitations preclude federal and state officials from identifying and pursuing all 
instances of  regulatory violations.  Aware of  these limitations, and intent on providing a 
safeguard against excessive alignment by regulators with the interests of  those they regulate, 
Congress included citizen suit provisions to supplement government enforcement initiatives.  
The CWA’s citizen suit provision serves as a safety net to catch violations that elude 
detection or enforcement by federal and state regulators.
The CWA vests concurrent jurisdiction in both the federal and state governments to enforce 
discharge limits and related permit responsibilities.  The CWA delegates to EPA fundamental 
oversight responsibilities but gives a state the first opportunity to address alleged violations 
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of  the permits it issues.  If  EPA discovers that a discharger has violated the terms of  a 
NPDES permit, EPA must first notify the discharger and the state.  The state then has a 30-
day period to take appropriate enforcement action against the discharger, after which EPA 
must issue an administrative compliance order or refer the case to the Department of  Justice 
(DOJ) for pursuit of  a formal, civil enforcement action.  The CWA allows EPA to bypass 
state enforcement, however, by issuing an administrative compliance order or referring the 
violation to the DOJ without waiting for the state to act.
Government enforcement of  laws such as the CWA generally follows one of  two models:  
deterrence-based or cooperative enforcement.  Since the enactment of  the CWA, EPA 
has relied primarily on deterrence-based enforcement to achieve the law’s water quality 
protection objectives, although it has used 
cooperative approaches as well in recent 
years.  
Deterrence-Based Enforcement
Deterrence-based enforcement is based 
on the theory that those subject to legal 
obligations weigh the costs and benefits 
of  complying with them.  If  the costs of  
complying with the law are lower than the 
costs of  violating it, a rational regulated 
entity will comply with the law, goes 
the theory.  If, however, the size of  the 
penalties for violation, discounted by the 
probability that the government will pursue 
them, makes it cheaper to violate than to 
comply, a rational profit-maximizer will 
choose noncompliance.  
Deterrence-based enforcement 
works, therefore, only if  the threat of  
enforcement is credible.  Part of  the 
calculus involves assessing the likelihood 
that the government will detect a 
violation and decide to take enforcement 
action.  In assessing whether compliance 
or noncompliance makes more sense, 
regulated entities will discount the amount 
of  the penalties that may result from 
enforcement by the probability that 
enforcement will occur.  
Deterrence-based enforcement  
is characterized by  
four essential elements:
Sufficient, consistent, and regular compliance monitoring to 1. 
identify violators.   
The Clean Water Act requires that regulated entities provide self-monitoring 
reports of their discharges to the enforcement authority and the public.  
These discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) disclose the pollution discharges 
recorded by the entity’s monitoring systems.  DMRs are an important tool in 
any enforcement program.  In addition to monitoring requirements, however, 
the typical NPDES permit imposes a range of other crucial requirements on 
facilities that may not be included in the DMR.  For example, a review of 
even properly completed DMRs would not reveal whether the equipment in 
question was operating correctly, nor would it reveal whether the facility had 
added unpermitted operations to its physical structure.  Limiting compliance 
monitoring to a paper review of DMRs cannot possibly form the foundation 
for a viable enforcement program.  As a practical matter, such reliance is the 
functional equivalent of allowing companies to regulate themselves. 
Timely initiation of enforcement actions against violators.  2.  
Once a violation is uncovered during a routine inspection of a regulated 
entity, the enforcement authority must assess civil and, in appropriate cases, 
criminal penalties against the owners and operators of the facility. 
A mandate that the violator come into compliance with applicable 3. 
laws and regulations.   
The CWA grants EPA and MDE ample authority to enjoin violators from 
engaging in future violations and this injunctive relief must be designed to 
establish a series of checks and balances to prevent recidivism. 
imposition of penalties that, at a minimum, eliminate any 4. 
economic benefit that the violator gained from violating the law 
and that provide a deterrent for future violations.   
All enforcement actions must recover the violator’s economic benefit of 
noncompliance or “avoided compliance costs” during the entire period of 
violations and, preferably, impose sufficient additional penalties to deter the 
targeted violator and all similarly situated regulated entities from committing 
future violations.  Unless the government extracts from violators the economic 
gains resulting from noncompliance, it will almost certainly be cheaper to 
violate and pay any penalties assessed than it would be to comply, thereby 
frustrating the essential underpinning of deterrence-based enforcement.
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The 2009 Enforcement Action Plan issued by EPA’s Office of  Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance describes well the outcomes deterrence-based enforcement seeks to 
promote: 
Effective enforcement programs create incentives for compliance by penal-
izing those who do not follow the law.  They establish a level playing field 
between those members of  the regulated community who comply and those 
who do not.  Enforcement ensures fair treatment – companies that compete 
against each other should not face wide disparities in treatment across the 
country, such as mandatory minimum penalties for a violation in one state 
and no enforcement in another. 
EPA’s civil penalties policy emphasizes two components:  (1) the gravity of  the violation 
and (2) recovery of  any financial gain derived by the regulated entity from violating the 
law (“benefit of  noncompliance”).  This policy is intended to ensure that violators gain 
absolutely no financial benefit from violating the law. 
Cooperative Enforcement
A second approach to enforcement has come into more frequent use in recent years.  
Cooperative enforcement is based on the theory that businesses are inclined to comply with 
the law because of  political, social, and economic norms and pressures.  These external and 
internal forces reduce the need for the imposition of  sanctions by enforcement agencies.  
The proponents of  this approach posit that violations occur because regulated entities, and 
in particular small businesses, are not familiar with the multiple and complex regulations 
in force.  Under this approach, regulatory agencies provide advice and consultation 
to businesses and the regulated community to prevent violations.  When a violation is 
identified, these agencies rely on cooperative approaches and voluntary efforts to bring 
violators into compliance as quickly as possible.
The effectiveness of  the cooperative, business-friendly enforcement strategies favored by 
a number of  states has yet to be proven.  Few states have demonstrated improvements in 
compliance or improved environmental conditions as a result of  a shift toward cooperative 
enforcement strategies.  If  a cooperative regime reduces incentives for compliance by 
lowering the likely costs of  noncompliance, reliance by state enforcement officials on this 
regime could lead to higher rates of  noncompliance by firms and increased public exposure 
to harmful pollutants.  It also could undermine the national uniformity Congress intended in 
enacting the federal environmental laws if  the penalties for noncompliance differ noticeably 
from state to state based on the enforcement model that each state adopts. 
Shortfalls in Funding
When EPA first started delegating federal authority to the states in the 1970s, it routinely 
awarded federal grants to states to assist with the costs of  the administrative infrastructure 
required to implement the program.  In the 1980s and 1990s, however, this funding gradually 
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declined, in large measure because of  budget deficits at the federal level.  
In recent years, states have been unable or unwilling to make up these 
shortfalls, creating a major challenge for state enforcement programs.  
Between fiscal years 1997 and 2006, federal funding for enforcement 
efforts in the EPA regions declined in real terms by 8 percent.  A 2009 
Government Accountability Report (GAO) emphasized that federal 
funding has not kept pace with inflation or the ever-growing list of  
regulatory responsibilities.  
In addition, the federal funds provided to the states and to EPA regions 
to implement and enforce state permit programs have not accounted for 
the current workload, including implementing basic statutory requirements 
under the CWA, or broader goals and objectives in the EPA’s strategic 
enforcement plan.1  For example, seeking to develop a more systematic, 
data-driven method for budgeting and allocating resources that more 
accurately reflected the resources needed by states to adequately fulfill 
their CWA implementation and enforcement responsibilities, in 1998 
EPA developed a tool to allow states to estimate the amount of  resources 
needed to fully implement the CWA.  Due in part to resource constraints, 
EPA did not implement this tool, despite the conclusion of  independent 
reviewers that it was sound and could have been useful.
A 2007 GAO report highlighted other obstacles to effective enforcement by federal and state 
officials.2  EPA lacks basic information about state enforcement programs, including whether 
states have enough enforcement personnel to meet the responsibilities the state undertook 
when it received authority to administer the NPDES program.  The GAO also found that 
unclear communication of  EPA planning and priority setting causes confusion within EPA 
regional offices and state agencies.  State officials complained of  micromanagement by EPA 
without explanation or consultation.  
Citizen Suit Enforcement
Like most federal environmental statutes, the CWA contains a citizen suit provision that 
empowers citizens and public interest organizations to bring enforcement actions against 
dischargers for violating their permits.3 In creating this second track of  enforcement by 
“private attorneys general,” Congress reasoned that the ability to bring such lawsuits would 
strengthen democratic values by allowing citizens to redress grievances; ensure that citizens, 
as well as well-financed regulated entities, have access to the federal courts in matters 
relating to implementation and enforcement of  the CWA; and complement government 
enforcement actions, particularly in situations where governmental action is deficient or 
lacking.    
The CWA’s citizen suit provision provides that any citizen may bring a civil action against 
any person who is alleged to be in violation of  an effluent standard or limitation or of  an 
For more information on 
deterrence-based enforcement: 
CPR, The States’ Role in Environmental Protec-•	
tion, http://www.progressivereform.org/persp-
Devolution.cfm; 
Joel Mintz, CPR, Environmental Enforcement:  •	
What Works?, http://www.progressivereform.org/
perspEnvironenforce.cfm;  
Robert Glicksman and Dale Earnhart, Depiction •	
of the Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship 
in the Chemical Industry:  Deterrence-Based v. 
Cooperative Enforcement, 31 Wm. & mary Envtl. 
l. & Pol’y rEv. 603 (2007), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=952778; and 
David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based •	
Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Rela-
tionship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 
24 Harv. Envtl. l. rEv. 1 (2000), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1547897.  
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administrative compliance order.4  Before proceeding, however, the citizen must give the 
Administrator of  EPA, the state, and the alleged violator notice of  the suit and must allow a 
60-day period for the violation to be corrected.  To help finance citizen suits, the court may 
award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.  
During the 60-day notice period, a state may initiate its own action against the violator.  
In several instances, states have “over-filed” enforcement actions within this time frame 
in state court.  These cases are often pursued at the request of  the violator, who solicits 
state enforcement to shield itself  from a citizen suit.  If  a state action commences and 
continues to diligently pursue enforcement action, the only remaining option for the citizen 
is to intervene in the suit at the state court level.  The availability of  opportunities for 
intervention depends on state law.  
Citizen suits have made a significant mark as an environmental enforcement tool.  One 
report found that between 1973 and 2002, citizens initiated actions that resulted in more 
than 1,500 reported federal decisions.5 In the decade between 1993 and 2002, federal courts 
averaged 110 civil environmental cases per year, approximately 75 percent of  which were 
citizen suits.6
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Maryland’s Clean Water Act Enforcement 
Program
MDE implements the NPDES permitting program of  the CWA through four programs:   
Municipal and Industrial Surface Water Discharges, •	 which covers traditional 
discharges through a pipe into lakes, rivers, and streams from publicly owned treat-
ment works (POTWs) and factories;
Pretreatment Industrial Discharges•	 , which covers discharges from an industrial 
plant into a POTW after pretreatment to lower chemical toxicity so that the POTW 
is capable of  adequately treating the waste;
Stormwater Management and Erosion & Sediment Control•	 , which covers run-
off  from land and paved surfaces into storm drains; and
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations•	 , which covers run-off  from farm 
facilities that raise more than a minimum number of  certain types of  livestock.  
These programs are housed in MDE’s Water Management Administration (WMA), which 
includes a Compliance Program as well as a range of  federal and state water permitting 
programs.  For the sake of  simplicity, the discussion below refers to these organizational 
units as MDE, unless otherwise noted.  In 2009, WMA had 46.4 full-time inspectors, who 
were responsible for 54,942 permits in all its programs, including CWA permitting programs 
and other state water law permitting programs.  For CWA programs alone, 13,681 permits 
were in effect in FY 2009. 
MDE assigns priority for its sharply limited inspection resources to (1) sites that are subject 
to complaints from citizens; (2) oversight of  owners and operators that have violated self-
monitoring and self-reporting requirements in the past; and (3) oversight of  owners and 
operators in violation of  the permitted effluent limits.  MDE conducts DMR reviews and, 
less frequently, site inspections to determine whether or not the facility or site meets the 
criteria for significant noncompliance.  The function of  these reviews is to assess:   
Whether the facility has exceeded the federal threshold for significant noncompli-• 
ance, which is a discharge of  20 percent or more above permitted levels for toxic 
pollutants or a discharge of  40 percent or more above permitted levels for conven-
tional pollutants;
Whether illegal discharges have caused or could cause an adverse impact to public • 
health or the environment; 
Whether the violation represents willful, chronic, or recalcitrant behavior; • 
Whether the plant owner or operator has deviated substantially from mandatory • 
permit terms or other binding documents; or 
Whether the violation is not corrected within 60 days of  notification that a violation • 
is occurring. 
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TABLE 1. Comparison of penalties under Maryland state law and the Clean Water Act
 State of Maryland  
Md. Envir. § 4-417
Clean Water Act  
33 U.S.C. § 1319
Civil Penalty – First 
Offense
Not exceeding $25,000 per day per violation
For CWA violations, not exceeding $10,000 
per day per violation.  See Md. Envt. Code 
§ 9-342 & 9-342.1 (2010).
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)
As enacted, not exceeding $25,000 per day per violation
For penalties effective after January 30, 1997, through March 15, 2004, not 
exceeding $27,500 per day per violation1
For penalties effective after March 15, 2004, through January 12, 2009, not 
exceeding $32,000 per day per violation
For penalties effective after January 12, 2009, not exceeding $37,500 per 
violation per day
Civil Penalty – 
Subsequent Offense
Additional civil penalty, up to $10,000 per 
day per violation, not exceeding a total of 
$100,000, considering penalty factors
n/a
Criminal For the first violation, conviction of a 
misdemeanor, and a fine not exceeding 
$50,000 or by imprisonment not 
exceeding 1 year, or both, and may be 
enjoined from continuing the violation
For a subsequent violation, a fine not 
exceeding $50,000 per day of violation 
and imprisonment not exceeding 2 years, 
or both
See below
Criminal Penalty – 
Negligent Offense
n/a 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)
For the first violation, a mandatory minimum fine of not less than $2,500 
nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or imprisonment of not 
more than 1 year, or both
For a subsequent violation, a fine of not more than $50,000 per day of 
violation or by imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or both
Criminal Penalty – 
Knowing Offense
n/a 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)
For the first violation, a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 
per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 3 years, or 
both  
For a subsequent violation, a fine of not more than $100,000 per day of 
violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 6 years, or both
Criminal Penalty – 
Falsification of 
Information & 
Tampering with 
Monitoring Devices
A fine not exceeding $10,000 or 
imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, 
or both
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4)
For the first violation, a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment 
of not more than 2 year, or both
For a subsequent violation, a fine of not more than $20,000 per day of 
violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 4 years, or both
Administrative n/a Class i Civil Penalty, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A)
As enacted, a fine not to exceed $10,000 per violation, and the maximum 
amount shall not exceed $25,000
For penalties effective after January 30, 1997, through March 15, 2004, a 
fine not to exceed $11,000 per violation; the maximum amount shall 
not exceed $25,000
For penalties effective after March 15, 2004, through January 12, 2009, 
a fine not to exceed $11,000; the maximum amount shall not exceed 
$32,500
For penalties effective after January 12, 2009, a fine not to exceed $16,000; 
the maximum amount shall not exceed $37,500
Class ii Civil Penalty, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(B)
As enacted, a fine not to exceed $10,000 per day per violation, and the 
maximum amount shall not exceed $125,000
For penalties effective after January 30, 1997, through March 15, 2004, a 
fine not to exceed $11,000 per day per violation; the maximum amount 
shall not exceed $137,500
For penalties effective after March 15, 2004, through January 12, 2009, 
a fine not to exceed $11,000; the maximum amount shall not exceed 
$157,500
For penalties effective after January 12, 2009, a fine not to exceed $16,000; 
the maximum amount shall not exceed $177,500
1   On January 12, 2009, the EPA’s Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule became effective.  This rule adjusts EPA’s civil monetary penalties 
for inflation.  The adjustment is based on the Consumer Price Index published by the U.S. Department of Labor.  40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2009).
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For violations that MDE deems minor, such as record-keeping or reporting errors, it has 
the discretion to allow the facility to correct a documented problem, either past or ongoing, 
without taking formal action.  Significant violations or repeated minor violations warrant 
more serious legal action, which can include a combination of  penalties, corrective orders, 
stop-work orders or injunctions, and criminal sanctions.
Maryland law provides the statutory minimums for civil and criminal penalties, as well as 
factors to determine the penalty amount.
MDE determines the size of  administrative penalties on the basis criteria such as:   
Willfulness of  the violation and pattern of  violation by facility;• 
Actual harm to the environment or human health;• 
Cost of  clean-up or restoration;• 
Ability to control, reduce, or prevent the violation; and• 
Degree of  danger posed by the violation. • 
Like most other federal and state enforcement agencies, MDE reduces penalties on the basis 
of  good faith behavior by the violator, including prompt self-disclosure of  the violation; 
prompt and voluntary corrective action; the development of  plans to prevent future 
recurrence of  the violation; and full cooperation with MDE to investigate the violation.
Noticeably missing from the list of  factors used to determine the penalty amount is any 
effort to recover the economic benefit of  the violation to the violator.  As discussed earlier, 
the recovery of  the violator’s economic benefit of  noncompliance is essential to an effective 
enforcement program.
Penalties may also take the form of  Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs), which 
are environmental projects undertaken by violators that are not otherwise required by law in 
lieu of  penalty dollars.  Between 2000 and 2009, MDE authorized a total of  31 SEPs with an 
estimated value of  $13,615,300.  While SEPs are intended to achieve environmental benefits 
that would not be achieved by traditional penalties, the same results may also be achieved 
by issuing strong injunctive relief  that makes parties clean up problems resulting from past 
noncompliance and protect the environment through future compliance.  
MDE also provides a variety of  pre-enforcement compliance education and assistance.  
For example, an inspector may identify a specific change that a regulated facility can 
make to prevent a future violation, and encourage the facility voluntarily and in a timely 
manner to correct the problem.  Through the Permitting and Customer Services Office, 
MDE also assists businesses that need permits or MDE approval to understand their legal 
responsibilities.   
Trends in Enforcement, 2000-2009
Under the Maryland Environment Code, section 1-301(d), MDE is required to publish an 
annual report on its enforcement activities during the previous year.  The following analysis 
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is based on data from FYs 2000 to 2009 contained in MDE’s Annual Enforcement and 
Compliance Reports, which are posted on MDE’s website.  
One of  the most striking aspects of  these reports, when examined cumulatively, is the 
overall decline in resources and a contemporaneous increase in permits and enforcement 
responsibilities.  The overall budget for MDE’s CWA enforcement workforce has decreased 
by almost 25 percent since 2000, adjusted for 2009 values.  While the FY 2009 budget 
represents an increase from the lowest budget in 2007, the overall decrease coincides with 
a doubling of  permits in effect during the same period.  Not surprisingly, the budget has a 
significant impact on the number of  inspectors. 
Similarly, the total number of  inspector 
positions allocated, including both filled and 
vacant positions, has decreased overall by 12 
percent from a high of  63.3 positions in 2000 
to a low of  around 47.5 positions in 2007 
and 2008.  In 2009, the number of  allocated 
positions increased to 55.9.  Even more 
dramatic, however, is the overall decrease in the 
number of  filled, full-time inspector positions, 
from 62 inspectors in 2000 to 46.4 inspectors 
in 2009—a 25-percent decrease in active 
inspectors.  With the doubling of  the number 
of  permits in effect, the decrease in full-time 
inspectors means that roughly 1,180 permits 
are in effect for each inspector, three times the 
number of  permits in 2000.
Moreover, MDE is settling for strikingly 
low penalties.  Overall, the average penalty 
obtained per enforcement action in the 
WMA over the past 10 years is approximately 
$1,260. Not all of  these actions fall under the 
CWA, but it it is startling to consider that this 
average is roughly 5 percent of  the maximum 
penalty per day authorized under the CWA, 
as enacted, and roughly 12.6 percent of  the 
penalty amount authorized per day for CWA 
violations Maryland law.
From 2000 to 2009, average penalties were 
higher for municipal and industrial dischargers 
with NPDES permits, averaging $8,265 
per enforcement action.  However, these 
FiGURE 9:  WMA: Enforcement Budget, inspectors,  
and Permits in Effect, FY 2000-2009
FiGURE 10:  WMA: Enforcement Budget, Compliance Assistance, 
and Enforcement Actions, FY 2000-2009
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are averages for enforcement actions.  The penalty structure under both Maryland law 
and the CWA provide for maximum daily penalties – enforcement actions often involve 
violations that happen more than once.   Under Maryland law, CWA violations are subject 
to a maximum penalty of  $10,000 per violation per day.  Under the Clean Water Act and 
subsequent adjustments for inflation, the currently penalty maximum is $37,500 per violation 
per day.  For example, if  a polluter violates its permit for three days, it would be subject to 
either a $30,000 maximum penalty amount under Maryland law or a $112,500 maximum 
under federal law, depending upon which court the case was brought.  While the number 
of  penalties issued in any given year does not necessarily reflect the effectiveness of  MDE’s 
enforcement program – a variety 
of  factors can explain a high or 
low collection rate – the average 
penalty obtained per enforcement 
action in Maryland is notably 
less than the maximum penalties 
provided per day by law.  
In a press release on the FY 2009 
enforcement and compliance 
report, MDE heralded a 7-percent 
increase in enforcement actions 
and a 17-percent rise in sites 
inspected, attributing these 
increases to an initiative to 
improve enforcement launched in 
2007.  The increase in enforcement 
actions came primarily in sectors 
unrelated to the CWA, such as 
drinking water and radiological 
health. 
The 2009 report notes that, 
despite this overall increase, 
many enforcement actions are in 
queue at the Attorney General’s 
Office.  The report acknowledges 
that “legal staffing has not kept 
pace,” and as a result, nearly 40 
percent of  MDE’s referrals—325 
cases of  816 cases referred—are 
still awaiting assignment to or 
active attention from MDE’s legal 
counsel.  For the three MDE 
TABLE 2. Water Management Administration: Enforcement Workforce
Year Amount FY 2009 
values2
Inspectors Vacancies Total 
Positions 
Allocated
2000 $3,396,824.00 $4,231,965.33 62 1.3 63.3
2001 $2,776,893.00 $3,535,764.14 53.08 3.3 56.38
2002 $2,964,915.00 $3,535,764.14 49.5 3.3 52.8
2003 $3,085,703.00 $3,597,812.31 48.8 7.2 56
2004 $3,050,817.00 $3,464,865.68 48.3 3.8 52.1
2005 $2,841,357.00 $3,121,229.94 44.7 5.2 49.4
2006 $2,624,959.00 $2,793,406.89 44.7 6.7 51.4
2007 $2,572,869.00 $2,662,150.44 37.6 9.8 47.4
2008 $2,892,037.00 $2,881,747.78 41.5 6 47.5
2009 $3,164,632.00 $3,164,632.00 46.4 9.5 55.9
overall 25% 25% 12%
2 These figures were adjusted by the authors according to the Bureau of Labor’s Consumer Price Index Calculator, 
available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
TABLE 3. Water Management Administration: inspectors and inspections
Year No. of Permits 
or Licenses in 
Effect
Full-time 
Inspectors
Permits Per 
inspector
No. of 
Inspections
inspections 
Per 
inspector
2000 24,108 62 389 9,916 159.9
2001 29,061 53.08 547 9,106 171.6
2002 28,685 49.5 579 10,146 205.0
2003 35,136 48.8 720 12,491 256.0
2004 40,611 48.3 841 13,044 270.1
2005 37,691 44.7 843 13,322 298.0
2006 40,782 44.7 912 12,637 282.7
2007 40,438 37.6 1,075 12,134 322.7
2008 61,294 41.5 1,477 8,630 208.0
2009 54,942 46.4 1,184 7,536 162.4
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NPDES programs for which the annual reports include data, in 2009, 76 cases have been 
resolved and 149 cases are ongoing.  While MDE’s legal counsel reports to the Attorney 
General, funding for their positions are located within MDE’s budget.
Municipal and industrial Surface Water Discharges  
(State and nPDES Permits)
Under the federal CWA and Maryland law, all industrial, commercial, or institutional facilities 
that discharge wastewater directly into the waters of  Maryland require a NPDES permit.  
Additionally, concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) must obtain NPDES permits. 
Between FY 2000 and FY 2009, the 
number of  permits in effect increased 
sharply, primarily due to dramatic 
increases in 2008 and 2009.  In FY 
2008 MDE began including all general 
permits for stormwater associated with 
construction activity in its calculation 
of  permits in effect.  General permits 
cover an entire category of  polluter.  
Permit holders need not apply for an 
individual NPDES permit, but must 
comply with the conditions attached 
to the general permit for the industrial 
category involved.  The program 
shows a gradual increase in the number 
of  site inspections, particularly between 2000 and 2007, but with significant drops in 2008 
and 2009.  The inspection coverage rate, as a result of  the dramatic increase in the numbers 
of  permits in effect, dropped sharply in 2008 and 2009, resulting in an overall decline in the 
inspection coverage rate.  From 2000 to 2009, the average penalty per enforcement action was 
approximately $8,265.
The number of  inspections taken in this program is tied to the weather and the number 
of  wet weather incidents during a particular year.  For example in FY 2003, an unusually 
wet year, the enforcement report noted the increased attention to sewage overflows from 
municipal sewer systems, which required an inspection of  each overflow or spill report 
received.  More generally, reports emphasized that inspections of  facilities with surface water 
discharge permits are a priority and that this program is a high priority.  
Pretreatment industrial Discharges 
MDE’s responsibility for regulating the discharge of  wastewaters extends to regulating 
wastewaters from industrial and other non-domestic sources discharged to publicly owned 
treatment works.  This oversight helps to ensure that these dischargers do not introduce 
FiGURE 6:  Surface Water nPDES Permits and inspections, FYs 2000-2009
*In 2008 and 2009, MDE began including general permits in the total number of permits, causing 
dramatic increases in those years.
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to municipal treatment works 
wastewater that could harm the 
works’ critical water infrastructure.  
As of  FY 2009, MDE has delegated 
responsibility for enforcement 
actions to 20 local pretreatment 
programs that are responsible for 
198 industrial sources.  These local 
pretreatment programs assume the 
enforcement duties and authorities 
of  MDE, according to MDE’s 
delegation agreement with EPA.  
The enforcement actions taken by 
these programs are not included 
in MDE’s enforcement statistics.  Instead, MDE compliance and enforcement efforts in the 
pretreatment sector focus on monitoring delegated local pretreatment programs and industrial 
dischargers that discharge to non-delegated local programs.  This supervision requires a 
significant commitment of  resources and, given Maryland’s shortfalls in other areas and the 
importance of  controlling this type of  discharge to the preservation of  environmental quality, 
this arrangement raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of  locally delegated programs 
in implementing CWA requirements. 
Between FY 2000 and 2009, enforcement activity by MDE remained relatively steady, with 
a nearly 100-percent inspection rate for the delegated authorities and industrial discharges 
that receive permits directly from MDE.  Compared to other programs, MDE oversees 
relatively few facilities under this program.  The number of  enforcement actions is low.  
When enforcement actions do occur, they are primarily compliance assistance activities.  
From 2000 to 2009, this program took only 13 penalty and other enforcement actions, not 
including compliance assistance.  The average penalty per action was $22,935.  Again, MDE’s 
annual reports do not include information on enforcement activities by locally delegated 
pretreatment programs, a crucial information gap.
Stormwater Management and Erosion & Sediment  
Control for Construction Activity
The purpose of  the stormwater program is to reduce the amount of  sediment and other 
pollution that flows into state waters from construction or land use activities associated 
with urbanization.  In Maryland, construction activity that disturbs more than 5,000 square 
feet or more of  land or results in 100 cubic yards or more of  earth movement is required 
to have stormwater management plans and erosion and sediment controls in place before 
construction activities begin.  MDE has delegated inspection and enforcement authority 
for erosion and sediment control to 14 counties and 10 municipalities.  The enforcement 
FiGURE 7:  Pretreatment industrial Discharge Permits and inspections
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activities conducted by these 
delegated authorities are not 
included in MDE’s enforcement 
statistics.  Again, the effectiveness 
and adequacy of  MDE’s supervision 
of  delegated authorities requires 
continued attention.
Under Maryland law, construction 
sites with approved erosion and 
sediment control plans must be 
inspected once every two weeks 
on average.  The enforcement 
reports freely concede inadequate 
inspections and state that “[t]his 
requirement is not being met due to workload.”  
Between FY 2000 and FY 2009, the number of  stormwater and erosion and sediment 
permits in effect has steadily increased overall, despite a sharp drop in permits in effect in 
2009. However, the number of  sites inspected has slowly decreased.  More telling, however, 
is the sharp decline in the inspection coverage rate, which is calculated as the number of  
sites inspected divided by the number of  permits in effect.  According to the reports, in the 
early 2000s, this program experienced persistent problems with staff  vacancies and with 
resources and staff  hours spent on transitioning to a new computer system.  However, 
during these years, MDE noted that the remaining inspectors were highly proficient and thus 
maintained relatively stable inspection rates.  The average penalty per enforcement action in 
this program from 2000 to 2009 was $4,786. 
Concentrated Animal Feeding operations
In 2009, a new permitting program became effective for large animal feeding operations 
that qualify as either a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) under federal law 
or a newly established Maryland animal feeding operation (MAFO).  Prior to the CAFO 
permitting program, farm operations were required to have Nutrient Management Plans 
(NMPs) for farm operators that gross more than $2,500 annually or have 8,000 pounds or 
more of  live animal weight.  Approximately 5,700 farm operations in Maryland are required 
to have NMPs.
The Maryland Department of  Agriculture (MDA) is the agency primarily responsible for 
inspecting and enforcing farm operators’ compliance with NMPs.  While not a traditional 
enforcement authority, MDA has authority under the Water Quality Improvement Act 
to enter farm facilities to take measurements, but farm operators strongly protest this 
authority.  After three citations from MDA, a farm facility in violation of  its NMP will be 
referred to MDE for further enforcement action, meaning that MDE is fairly far removed 
FiGURE 8:  Stormwater, Sediment and Erosion Control Permits and 
inspections, FYs 200-2009
Page 24 Center for Progressive Reform
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
from enforcement of  water quality from farm facilities.  MDA’s enforcement program 
consists of  on-site inspections, analysis of  self-reports by farm operators, and follow-up 
from citizen complaints.  MDA states that it conducts on-site inspections of  10 percent of  
farm operations to determine compliance with NMPs.  Little recent information on specific 
enforcement activities is available.  
The new CAFO permit is a separate and distinct program, enforceable by MDE.  Whether 
or not a farm facility falls under this new permitting program hinges, in part, on whether it 
“proposes to discharge,” or is designed with a conveyance system to remove contaminated 
runoff  or wastewater from the production area to the surface waters of  Maryland.  If  a farm 
qualifies as a CAFO, it is required to obtain a Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plan 
(CNMP) from the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service.  If  a farm qualifies as a 
MAFO, it must obtain both an NMR and a conservation plan or a CNMP.  All other farms 
are still required to have NMPs, enforceable by MDA as described above, under Maryland 
law.  The CAFO program authorizes on-farm inspections and enforcement of  water quality 
problems by MDE. 
Because this program is new, there are limited statistics regarding enforcement efforts.  As of  
March 2010, some 506 farms have submitted applications for CAFO status.
Gaps in MDE’s Annual Reports and Enforcement Data
The clearest observation in enforcement in Maryland is that resources have decreased at 
the same time that the number of  permitted facilities has increased dramatically.  Fewer 
inspectors are responsible for assessing compliance with more and more permits, and 
inspection coverage rates are down, meaning more facilities slide by each year without 
physical inspections.  
Yet the statistics in MDE’s annual enforcement reports do not present a complete picture 
because, although MDE offers explanations for variations from year to year, those 
explanations do not fully or thoroughly detail MDE’s enforcement actions.  Instead, the 
reports use different definitions of  site categories from year to year, making it difficult to 
track trends.  They also have crucial information gaps and reporting inconsistencies. 
Significantly, the enforcement statistics in MDE’s reports do not include enforcement 
activities conducted by other local delegated jurisdictions and vary depending on how 
certain enforcement activities are counted.  In Maryland, 20 publicly owned treatment works 
have delegated enforcement authority over indirect industrial dischargers to their facilities.  
However, MDE does not include this information in its annual reports.  Both MDE and 
the public would benefit from having this information available to determine whether these 
delegated authorities are conducting appropriate enforcement actions.  
The reports sometimes include DMR reviews in the number of  sites inspected, even though 
the sites are not physically inspected.  This counting method increases the inspection 
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coverage rate for individual programs, even though the number of  physical site inspections 
has not actually increased or, in some instances, has decreased.  For the Municipal and 
Industrial Surface Water Discharges, the inspection coverage rate from 2000 to 2007 is fairly 
high, ranging from a low of  49 percent in 2000 to a high of  89 percent in 2007.  However, 
in 2008 and 2009, MDE separated the number of  sites physically inspected from the sites 
audited but not inspected (previously combined), and the coverage rate dropped significantly, 
to a mere 14 percent and 10 percent, respectively.7  This inconsistent counting method 
renders comparisons of  statistics from year to year very difficult, even though the reports are 
required to contain the same information.  
Furthermore, the Compliance Program freely acknowledges—and the enforcement statistics 
clearly demonstrate—that the vast majority of  inspection and monitoring activities are 
not physical on-site inspections.8  Instead MDE relies on self-reporting by the regulated 
community.  While these reports are an important part of  environmental enforcement, 
they can never substitute for physical inspections.  The reports may be fraudulent or fail to 
include important information; they do not account for unpermitted activities; and DMRs 
represent only the extent to which sources complied with their discharge limits, but not 
other important obligations, such as compliance with schedules for construction of  new 
pollution control techniques. 
In 2005, a federal court indicated that paper reviews of  self-monitoring reports are 
insufficient to assure compliance under an analogous federal environmental act.  This 
court struck down a rule issued under the Clean Air Act that governed the scope of  the 
Act’s new source review permit program based on EPA’s implicit assumption that sources 
are trustworthy and will provide accurate information that is relevant to determining their 
compliance status.9  The court concluded that EPA took inadequate steps to verify the 
accuracy of  the information supplied by regulated sources on their compliance status.  
Thus, relying on agency review of  paper records submitted by regulated entities, without 
follow-ups in the form of  on-site inspections, is an inadequate response to an increase in 
the number of  permits issued.  Instead, agency personnel and resources must keep pace as 
the scope of  regulated programs expands so that on-the-ground inspections are conducted 
with regularity.  Any other result is sure to result in slippage in the form of  lower compliance 
rates.
Finally, the annual enforcement reports from 2006-2009 contain considerably less 
information, self-evaluation, and explanations of  the statistics than in previous years.  
Including this information would help make the data more understandable and benefit 
both MDE, by providing the opportunity to explain any discrepancies, and the public, by 
enhancing the transparency of  agency enforcement activity.
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interview Findings 
To better understand how enforcement works on the ground, CPR conducted a series of  
interviews with Maryland stakeholders to determine how they perceive MDE’s enforcement 
program and to help identify strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in enforcement.  CPR 
requested interviews with 20 stakeholders who represent a diverse group of  current and 
former government officials, members of  the regulated community, and public interest 
groups.  Of  the 20 individuals or organizations with which CPR requested interviews, four 
declined or did not respond.  Their views are not included.  The findings below are drawn 
from interviews with the remaining 16 stakeholders.   
Collectively these interviewees have decades of  enforcement experience in federal, state, 
and local government levels, in the regulated sector, and in the public interest community.  
Eleven of  the participants are attorneys by training, and their past and current experience 
covers both prosecuting and defending environmental enforcement cases at all levels.  The 
interview participants were thus able to provide an expert and holistic view of  MDE’s 
enforcement program, drawing on their past and current experiences.
The stakeholders interviewed include:   
Jane Barrett• , Associate Professor and Director, University of  Maryland Environ-
mental Law Clinic, and former Attorney, Environmental Crimes Unit, OAG, and 
former Chief, Environmental Litigation, and Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of  
Maryland;
valerie Connelly• , Director of  Government Relations, Maryland Farm Bureau; 
James L. Hearn• , Environmental Legislative Support, Washington Suburban Sanitary 
Commission, and former Director, Water Management Administration, MDE; 
Brad Heavner• , State Director, Environment Maryland; 
Robert Hoyt• , Director, Montgomery County Department of  Environmental Pro-
tection, and former Assistant Secretary, MDE;
Jonas Jacobson• , Director, Baltimore County Department of  Environmental Protec-
tion and Resource Management, and former Deputy Secretary, MDE;
Steven Johnson• , Principal Counsel to MDE, OAG; 
Tina Meyers• , Fellow, University of  Maryland Environmental Law Clinic; 
Jonathan Mueller• , Director of  Litigation, Chesapeake Bay Foundation and former 
Senior Attorney, Environmental Enforcement Section, U.S. Department of  Justice;
Jennifer Peterson• , Attorney, Environmental Integrity Project;
Eliot Powell• , President, Whitehall Development, Inc., & President, Maryland 
Homebuilders Association;
Michael Powell• , Member, Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hollander, 
LLC, and former Principal Counsel to MDE, OAG;
Dusty Rood• , Principal, Rodgers Consulting;  
Eric Schaeffer• , Executive Director, Environmental Integrity Project and former 
Director, Office of  Civil Enforcement, U.S. EPA;
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Larry Simns• , President, Maryland Watermen’s Association; and
Eliza Smith Steinmeier• , Executive Director, Baltimore Harbor Waterkeeper. 
Interview requests were also sent to the following individuals, who declined to participate or 
did not respond:   
Jerome Blask• , General Counsel, Washington Sanitary Sewer Commission (declined);
Deborah Jennings• , Partner and Chair, Environmental Practice Group, DLA Piper 
(did not respond);
Kendl Philbrick• , former Secretary, MDE (unavailable); and
Bill Satterfield• , Executive Director, Delmarva Poultry Industry, Inc. (declined, cit-
ing “little involvement with MDE enforcement programs and actions and therefore 
little knowledge of  most of  the [interview] questions….  I am safe in saying that our 
members prefer a cooperative, incentive-based program to achieve environmental 
improvements rather than an enforcement emphasis”).
CPR provided a draft copy of  this report to MDE and met with MDE enforcement staff  
and personnel to discuss their response to the report.  MDE’s response is included at the 
end of  this report.  CPR met with the following MDE staff:
Sue Battle-McDonald• , Director, BayStat;
Andrew Godsen• , Lead Editor of  Annual Reports;
Jack Bowen• , Manager, Regulatory Programs, WMA;
Dave Lyons• , Program Manager, Compliance Program, WMA; and 
Terri Wilson• , Director, Office of  Budget & Finance.
The findings below are a narrative synthesis of  all the interviews CPR conducted in January 
and February 2010.  The interviewees do not necessarily endorse any of  the recommenda-
tions made in this report, which are the authors’ alone.  The interviewees also participated 
and spoke on their own behalf  and not on behalf  of  the agency or organization for which 
they work.  Interviewees are identified as follows:  “official,” for former and current govern-
mental officials, “environmental,” for representatives from environmental and public interest 
groups, and “industry,” for representatives from the regulated community.  
CPR asked interviewees a series of  open-ended questions about MDE’s enforcement 
program, including the role of  MDE enforcement actions and citizen suits, the deterrent 
effect of  the different types of  enforcement, and recommendations for changing the 
enforcement program.  As noted earlier, interviewees were told that their specific remarks 
would not be attributed to them personally. 
Interviewees generally reached a consensus that resource limitations have hindered MDE’s 
enforcement program and OAG’s ability to pursue cases referred to it by MDE.  They 
also tended to agree that criminal enforcement should be increased for particularly willful 
and egregious violations when a criminal law is clearly violated.  Interviewees disagreed on 
many other issues, however, including the institutional and permitting aspects of  MDE’s 
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enforcement program, the nature of  MDE’s enforcement approach and actions, the role and 
effectiveness of  citizen suits in enforcement, and the role of  EPA.
Evaluations of MDE’s Enforcement Program
Evaluations of  the reasons for weaknesses in the enforcement program fell into four broad 
categories:  resource limitations on enforcement; institutional limitations on enforcement; 
permits as the basis of  enforcement; and the nature of  enforcement actions taken by MDE. 
All	interviewees	agreed	that	MDE	should	have	the	primary	responsibility	for	
enforcement of  Clean Water Act requirements in Maryland with citizen suits and 
EPA taking a secondary role, if  any.  
As one official said, “MDE needs to enforce the rules on the books.  If  there is a violation, 
the regulated community needs to know that the violator will be caught.”  Another 
official likened enforcement and compliance to “having a child.  Children will try to push 
boundaries of  what’s acceptable or appropriate.  Because [enforcement] comes down to 
money, businesses and even local governments will push the issue until they are caught.”  
When asked about the role of  enforcement efforts in restoring the Chesapeake Bay, two 
interviewees expressed similar concerns.  They both felt that the current enforcement 
program is limited.  One industry interviewee noted that existing regulations do not cover 
all the sources of  pollution, and the other, an official, noted that laws alone will not clean up 
the Bay.  This person said, “Enforcement can only ensure that the law is enforced, but there 
will never be enough laws—nor would the public want all the laws—required to clean up the 
Bay.”  
Resource Limitations
Nearly	all	interviewees	lamented	the	lack	of 	financial	resources	available	to	MDE	
and	empathized	with	existing	personnel	who	are	being	asked	to	do	more	with	less	
money.  
One industry interviewee pointed out a basic dilemma:  Maryland “can’t keep diverting 
resources and adding more statutory requirements and expect things to improve.”  Another 
complained that funding for a regulatory or assistance program often disappears as priorities 
change, sometimes leaving a functioning, effective program without the resources to 
continue.  An industry interviewee said, “They’re stealing from [an older] program to fund a 
new program because it is the flavor of  the day.” 
Another environmental interviewee pushed back by suggesting that if  MDE has no 
resources, the costs of  compliance should be allocated to the regulated community.  This 
interviewee noted that it does not cost MDE anything more to “hold the line until industry 
does all its requirements,” meaning that MDE could withhold permits or permit approvals 
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until industry comes into compliance without expending any financial resources.  Another 
environmental interviewee said, “It doesn’t cost any more to make a good permit than a bad 
one.”  
A	majority	of 	interviewees	also	cited	the	need	to	increase	both	permit	fees	and	
penalties to help cover the costs of  MDE’s enforcement program.
As one environmental interviewee said, “In general penalties are pretty low and that’s a 
national problem.  Penalties need to be predictable and regular.”  Another official remarked, 
“Judges have enormous discretion to impose fines that are too low.”  One environmental 
interviewee suggested that Maryland pass mandatory minimum penalty laws.   
Nearly all interviewees expressed dismay at the lack of  inspectors and the lack of  
inspections	in	MDE’s	enforcement	program	and	cited	a	need	to	increase	both.		
One industry interviewee observed that population growth in Maryland means an increase 
in pollution problems, which requires more inspectors.  Another official echoed this 
observation, finding that reduced personnel have not been replaced and that the budget 
situation is “not good.”  Another industry interviewee felt that a fully staffed enforcement 
workforce would “paradoxically” benefit the regulated community because more inspectors 
would allow MDE to distinguish more easily between the “good guys” and the “bad guys” 
instead of  the “tendency to overreach in the first go-round.”    
Regarding inspections, one official said that, unless MDE receives a complaint, there are 
“very infrequent site visits.”  Site visits are an important component of  the enforcement 
program because, as this official complained, there are “too many instances of  fraudulent 
[discharge monitoring reports],” which cannot be discovered without site visits. 
To address these problems, one industry interviewee said, “That is the single biggest 
change they need—more people out in the field going from place to place.”  This statement 
was echoed by nearly every interviewee.  Recognizing that the “work of  agency staff  is 
complicated and technically challenging,” one environmental interviewee suggested that 
MDE needs resources to “retain capable staff.”  Although there “are definitely some,” MDE 
must have the financial ability to retain inspectors so that they “hang in there.” 
institutional Limitations 
Interviewees expressed a range of  opinions on the institutional challenges to enforcement, 
assessing in different ways the political will and leadership to enforce, the relationships 
between MDE and stakeholders, and the appropriateness of  MDE’s mentality and attitude 
toward citizen suits.  
Interviewees	disagreed	on	the	political	will	at	MDE	to	pursue	robust	enforcement	
policies.  Industry interviewees generally thought that MDE’s current leadership is 
strong,	while	officials	and	environmental	interviewees	had	more	negative	reactions.		
“That’s the single 
biggest change 
they need—more 
people out in the 
field going from 
place to place,” 
said one industry 
interviewee.  
Another said that 
more inspectors 
would paradoxically 
benefit industry 
by allowing MDE 
the resources 
to distinguish 
between the good 
guys and the bad 
guys, instead of 
”the tendency to 
overreach in the 
first go-round.”
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Two	interviewees	found	Maryland’s	enforcement	program	to	be	average	when	
compared to other states.  
A few interviewees assessed the political leadership under Governor Martin O’Malley and 
Secretary Shari Wilson as strong.  “In Maryland, we don’t suffer from weak enforcement 
or lack of  political will,” said an industry interviewee.  Another environmental interviewee 
felt that MDE is “making an honest effort at using their limited resources wisely.”  Most 
interviewees agreed that MDE’s current enforcement program is a big improvement over 
that of  Governor O’Malley’s recent predecessors, Bob Ehrlich and Parris Glendening.  
One official noted the difference in enforcement activities between the administrations of  
different political parties, noting more enforcement under Democratic administrations than 
Republican administrations.  An industry interviewee said the program has been “proactive 
and understandable” with a “clear uptick” in the last two to four years.  
Others expressed disappointment with the current enforcement program, noting that they 
had higher hopes with Governor O’Malley taking office.  One environmental interviewee 
attributed the decline in enforcement to “a problem at the top,” saying that the secretary 
and governor “don’t want enforcement against industry or agriculture or to create stronger 
regulations.”  While admitting that the lack of  resources and funding and the overall budget 
crunch are “legitimate problems,” this interviewee declared, “There is a lack of  political will 
from the top.”  
At least two interviewees explicitly compared MDE’s enforcement program to other states’ 
enforcement programs.  One environmental interviewee described MDE’s enforcement 
program as “middle of  the pack—slightly under par,” while an official evaluated the 
program more positively, noting the “considerably higher” number of  violations flagged for 
formal enforcement actions.  The environmental interviewee said, “MDE’s website isn’t as 
sophisticated or … transparent [as] other states’ websites.  The right-to-know shouldn’t be a 
big issue in Maryland, and the permits and violations data should be there:  easy to read and 
access.”
One environmental interviewee remarked that Maryland has a mobile, highly educated 
population and lots of  wealth.  Its enforcement program “should be better than other states 
with higher poverty rates and concentrated industries that wield a lot of  political clout.  
Maryland doesn’t have the same excuses and prides itself  on being very progressive.  Our 
enforcement program doesn’t match the demographics and politics of  the state.” 
One official noted that the Chesapeake Bay is a driver for enforcement because it gives 
MDE and Maryland a higher profile than other regions with less famous or less historically 
important waterways.  Yet another environmental interviewee said that the long history of  
Bay restoration was an obstacle to an active and vigorous enforcement program.  “The Bay 
restoration effort has been going on for so long now, and there’s a mentality that there’s 
nothing that will help all that much, so just plug away and be satisfied.”  
“The Bay 
restoration effort 
has been going 
on for so long 
now, and there’s a 
mentality that 
there’s nothing 
that will help 
all that much, 
so just plug 
away and be 
satisfied,” said 
one environmental 
interviewee.
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Interviewees had different and contrasting opinions on MDE’s relationships with 
the	regulated	community	and	with	public	interest	groups	and	their	impacts	on	
enforcement.  Both industry and environmental interviewees expressed suspicion 
that MDE favors the other side.  Both environmental and industry interviewees 
recommended a more inclusive decision-making process.  
In one environmental interviewee’s experience, “the bias of  the permit writers is to give in to 
the industry.”  This interviewee suggested that MDE should chart a middle course between 
environmental groups and the regulated community so that the agency is not “caving to 
industry all the time.”  Another environmental interviewee described a meeting where MDE 
asked for the opinion of  the regulated community on minimum standards for a permit, 
instead of  presenting the regulated community with its own standards and soliciting input.  
In contrast, other interviewees felt that public interest groups have a closer relationship 
with MDE than the regulated community.  One official said that under Governor O’Malley 
and Secretary Wilson, MDE is “very sensitive to environmental groups.”  Another added 
that the relationship between MDE and the regulated community is “distrustful, not 
cooperative,” and “very adversarial.”  Another industry interviewee presented a less negative 
evaluation, noting that MDE’s relationship with the regulated community varies by site.  This 
interviewee has never seen “a single instance of  MDE letting [a polluter] off  easy.”  Another 
industry interviewee described the “crystal palace effect,” meaning that MDE operates 
“off  in a separate world.  If  there was more open communication … there may be clearer 
guidelines, [which] could lead to less infractions.”  And, “The more they distance themselves 
from the regulated community, the more ignorance there will be on both parties’ parts, and 
greater opportunity for violations.”  
According to one environmental interviewee, MDE needs a reminder that “they are 
working for the benefit of  the health of  citizens and resources, not at the behest of  industry 
stakeholders.”  Another environmental interviewee noted that people have low confidence 
in government.  By taking strong action and making their enforcement presence known, 
MDE can increase the effectiveness of  their actions.  “The public isn’t against enforcement, 
but MDE is afraid of  giving Maryland an anti-business reputation.  Law-abiding businesses 
should be happier to have a consistent playing field.”  
Several	interviewees	described	challenges	posed	by	an	institutional	culture	at	MDE	
that	is	threatened	by	citizen	suits.		
One environmental interviewee described an ingrained mentality that “citizen suits are a 
threat.”  Another attributed this mentality in part to recent activity by citizens to become 
more active, unlike in the past.  This interviewee said, “The more that citizen groups 
participate, the more likely it is that the bureaucratic obstacles will improve.”  Citizen suits 
are discussed in further detail in the next section.  
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The Permitting Program 
Several	interviewees	across	the	board	emphasized	the	need	for	a	stronger	permitting	
program, citing weak or unclear permits as a major source of  confusion for everyone 
affected	by	enforcement	and	compliance	efforts.		A	few	interviewees	recommended	
strengthening	the	permitting	program	by	writing	stronger	permits	and	increasing	
legal	review	of 	permits	by	the	OAG,	discussed	below.	
One environmental interviewee described the permitting program as the “keystone of  the 
enforcement program” and the “teeth of  the clean water restoration program.”  Another 
industry interviewee said that weak permits are a source of  frustration for both the 
regulated community and public interest groups.  Weak permits “shield certain sectors from 
enforcement action.”  This industry interviewee noted that permits that are not “written 
clearly enough to determine if  a violation has occurred” are “one of  the major complaints 
and frustrations.” 
Interviewees gave similar explanations for the weakness in MDE’s permitting program:  a 
lack of  internal staff  training, the lack of  resources, the inability to retain skilled personnel, 
and the lack of  input and review from the OAG.  One environmental interviewee said that 
MDE staff  “scratch their heads because they simply aren’t aware of  the requirements.”  
Another official noted that there is currently “greater sensitivity to writing an effective 
permit.”
At least two industry interviewees disagreed with the general evaluation of  MDE’s 
permitting program.  One observed that the regulations and enforcement have both changed 
significantly over the past decade, resulting in an overall tightening of  restrictions, more 
stringent permit requirements, and greater review of  permits.  The other interviewee, while 
allowing that permitting is “an area where [MDE] could improve,” clarified that “unclear 
permits are the exception and not the rule.” 
An official and an environmental interviewee expressed their concerns about the permit 
shield defense stemming from the CWA and recommended that MDE clarify the extent 
of  the shield.  The permit shield defense arises from section 402(k) of  the CWA.  Under 
this provision, a discharger’s compliance with its NPDES permit is regarded as compliance 
with all of  the source’s legal obligations under the Clean Water Act.  In 2001, the Court 
of  Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to which Maryland belongs, held that discharges 
of  pollutants not explicitly listed in the NPDES permit but “within the reasonable 
contemplation of  the permitting authority at the time the permit was issued” were also 
covered by the permit shield.  This ruling is troublesome because it undermines the intent of  
the CWA, which requires a permit for the discharge of  all pollutants. 
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The nature of MDE’s Enforcement Actions
Interviewees also expressed opinions on different aspects of  MDE’s enforcement actions, 
including the preferred type of  enforcement action; the method of  MDE enforcement; the 
assessment of  penalties; the gaps in enforcement; and the impartiality of  state courts.
The Type of Enforcement Action:  Cooperative or Deterrent
Interviewees	generally	agreed	that	MDE	should	maintain	both	a	cooperative	and	a	
traditional,	deterrence-based	enforcement	program	and	that	the	form	of 	enforcement	
should	be	tailored	to	the	violation.		A	handful	of 	interviewees	said	that	MDE	should	
engage	in	cooperative	efforts	to	educate	the	regulated	community	about	applicable	
regulations.  
When asked about the types of  enforcement that MDE uses—informal, cooperative 
enforcement or formal, traditional deterrence-based enforcement—interviewees generally 
agreed that the type of  enforcement action should depend on the nature of  the violation.  
They said that MDE should distinguish between repeat or willful violations and first-
time violators.  A few environmental interviewees recommended that Maryland establish 
chronic violator laws that authorize higher penalties and consequences for repeat offenders.  
First-time violations that MDE can catch early “should be cooperatively brought into 
compliance.”  But most felt that MDE should maintain the traditional deterrence-based 
approach.  As one official declared, “Cooperative enforcement should not ever replace 
[traditional enforcement].”  Another observed that MDE is doing less compliance counseling 
than in the past and is pursuing mandatory enforcement actions for any significant 
violations.
Most industry interviewees preferred cooperative enforcement and thought MDE could 
improve by educating the regulated community about applicable regulations.  One industry 
interviewee said, “Most companies are ignorant and careless.  You can usually fix the 
problem by telling them what they are doing is stupid.  They are careless and not paying 
attention.”  As an industry interviewee observed, for the most part regulated entities are 
inclined to comply, but there will always be a few that “thumb their nose at the law.”
The Method of MDE Enforcement:  Spotlights or Sweeps
A few interviewees criticized MDE’s method of  spotlight enforcement, or pursuing a 
few major violations rather than engaging in consistent and uniform sector sweeps.  
As one industry interviewee explained, “There’s better ways to enforce.”  This interviewee 
analogized the enforcement program to the enforcement of  speed limits.  “You can have 
lots of  police who catch lots of  speeders and write lots of  small tickets.  Or you can have 
a few police, catch a few speeders, and shoot them.”  This analogy was echoed by at least 
three other industry interviewees.  They expressed frustration that MDE uses the second 
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strategy—a few major enforcement cases with severe penalties, “an exaggerated response to 
a particular situation.”  According to one, this strategy is “not the best way to do it.”
Some interviewees suggested that instead of  focusing on a few violators and assessing 
large fines, MDE should pick one area and flood it with inspectors and have progressive 
fines for repeat violations.  An environmental interviewee echoed this idea of  enforcement 
sweeps by sector.  In this interviewee’s experience, this type of  sweep “tends to get a high 
response rate, and those who fail to respond become less sympathetic and more vulnerable 
to enforcement.”
Others complained that MDE fails to take advantage of  citizen suits and often acts 
too slowly.  
Several interviewees criticized MDE’s unwillingness to fully utilize citizen suits to 
supplement enforcement and relieve the agency of  the burden of  carrying the full 
enforcement load.  One industry interviewee also criticized MDE for acting too slowly, 
citing the time delay between reporting a violation and the arrival of  MDE inspectors at the 
site.  By the time the inspectors arrive, this interviewee said, “The pollution has stopped,” 
adding that sometimes it feels like MDE “tips off  the polluters.”
The Assessment of Penalties
Some	interviewees	lamented	the	low	penalties	assessed	by	MDE	and	their	negligible	
impact on deterrence.  
Among some interviewees, there is a perception that MDE sets penalties at levels that 
are not sufficient to create an effective deterrent to noncompliance, causing the regulated 
community to view those penalties as the necessary “cost of  doing business,” to be regarded 
no differently than payroll, equipment purchase, and other ongoing costs.  In response, one 
industry interviewee said that this mentality operates on a case-by-case basis.  “There will 
always be a few that would rather pay the fine than pay for the upgrades.”  Another industry 
interviewee categorically denied that regulated companies calculate MDE enforcement 
penalties as the cost of  doing business.  Considering the legal fees and the public relations 
impact, regulated entities “clearly never make money” from a deliberate violation.
Another industry interviewee echoed that position, finding that MDE retains a “powerful 
hammer” in imposing penalties.  This interviewee observed that fines, stop-work orders, and 
bad publicity all work effectively to ensure compliance.  “No one wants to be in the public 
eye or have work stopped.”  This interviewee has seen some regulated facilities that are 
“extremely paranoid about compliance,” since bad publicity and MDE enforcement actions 
are equal “black eyes” that the regulated community strives to avoid.  
“You can have lots 
of police who catch 
lots of speeders 
and write lots of 
small tickets. or 
you can have 
a few police, 
catch a few 
speeders, and 
shoot them,” 
said one industry 
interviewee.  
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The Gaps in Enforcement
When asked which, if  any, sectors MDE overlooks in its enforcement actions, 
responses	naturally	reflected	the	particular	interests	of 	the	interviewees.		However,	
most interviewees agreed that agriculture is an overlooked sector and that MDE 
should have greater authority to inspect farms. 
One industry interviewee distinguished between sectors and types of  pollution problems.  
This interviewee did not think that any sector is overlooked, but opined that difficult 
pollution problems are being overlooked.  A few officials echoed this opinion, citing 
pollution problems from facilities that are large local employers or that contribute 
significantly to the local economy.  As one official said, “There is a reluctance to use taxpayer 
funds to penalize these sources.”  An environmental interviewee countered that industry too 
often “plays the recession card,” claiming enforcement and new regulations will cost jobs.
One industry interviewee clarified that MDE does not overlook any sectors, but it is the 
lack of  resources that prevents MDE from getting to some sectors on a timely basis.  A 
few also expressed a desire to see enforcement efforts in proportion to a sector’s pollution 
contribution.  
Most interviewees specified agriculture as the one sector that MDE overlooks.  One 
environmental interviewed declared, “Agriculture is the most ridiculously unregulated 
and unenforced sector.”  “It is ridiculous that MDA should be made the enforcers [for 
agriculture]—they should shift it to MDE.”  This interviewee described the dynamic 
between MDA and MDE on CAFO enforcement as “antagonistic.”  Another official also 
questioned the appropriateness of  vesting in MDA enforcement authority over nutrient 
management plans, discussed earlier in the CAFO section.  This interviewee felt that MDA is 
“not qualified to make decisions about how much nutrients can go into the Bay.”  
The impartiality of State Courts
At	least	five	officials	and	environmental	interviewees	agreed	that	state	courts	
were not the ideal venue to hear civil or criminal environmental enforcement 
actions.		Some	officials	preferred	administrative	hearings,	and	some	environmental	
interviewees	expressed	a	preference	for	citizen	suits	because	they	are	heard	in	federal	
court. 
As one official said, “State courts and judges are less knowledgeable and are more tied to 
their communities, meaning they are less independent.  If  the citizen suit alleges violations 
against an influential entity, bringing a case in state court can be problematic.”  Another 
environmental interviewee observed that state courts are “somewhat hostile to intervention” 
by citizen groups in state court.  Another is “baffled” by the state court system and said 
that the U.S. Attorney’s Office complains “bitterly” about the quality of  state court judges.  
“Some cases you can’t get anywhere in state court.  You need to be in federal court.”  
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Another official said that state court judges are “unbelievably predisposed to defendants” 
and “hostile to MDE.”  This interviewee expressed a personal lack of  confidence in the state 
court system, and no confidence that state courts are impartial.  Officials and environmental 
interviewees preferred federal courts because there are higher penalties and more objective, 
independent judges.  
One official recommended that MDE take more actions to court, rather than 
administratively settling them, because the penalties and judgments are greater in courts 
and administrative settlements are “quick and easy” for violators.  This recommendation 
contrasted with another official, who cited the administrative courts’ deference to the agency 
as a significant factor in favor of  administrative courts.  In this person’s opinion, despite the 
lower administrative penalty caps and the potentially stronger message that judicial actions 
might send, administrative hearings may still be preferable because the administrative judges 
have specific knowledge about environmental regulations, are more neutral, and are more 
deferential to MDE than state courts.
The Role, impact, and Effectiveness of Citizen Suits 
While interviewees generally agreed on MDE’s role in enforcement, views on the 
role of  citizen suits in enforcement were not as cohesive and, indeed, were often 
diametrically	opposed.		Nearly	equal	numbers	of 	interviewees	expressed	support	
for citizen suits as an additional resource for MDE enforcement efforts as those who 
expressed	skepticism	about	the	value	and	usefulness	of 	these	suits.	
Those who favored the use of  citizen suits, including environment and some government 
officials, described them as “a critical piece of  the enforcement tool set,” a “check and 
balance,” and a “helpful [way to] to drive action and policy.”  From prior experience, one 
environmental interviewee stated, “When industry realizes citizens are out there keeping 
watch, too, citizen suits are more effective.”  Another environmental interviewee said that 
citizen suits are an “essential component” because enforcement resources “are always going 
to be strained.”  Another industry interviewee expressed a more neutral view, acknowledging 
“there are instances where the threat of  citizen suits can serve as a deterrent, but [they] 
shouldn’t be used arbitrarily because it wastes a lot of  resources by all parties.”  
One environmental interviewee suggested that MDE would be “so much better off  to admit 
no resources,” so that it could accept the help of  citizen groups without embarrassment or 
impacting citizens’ faith in government.
Among those who were more skeptical about the role of  citizen suits, one industry 
interviewee likened the impact of  citizen suits to “putting a grain of  sand on the beach 
to make it bigger.”  “Citizen suits are overrated as a tool for significant change.”  Another 
industry interviewee commented that citizen suits “affect the timing [of  an enforcement 
action] but seldom change the outcome.”  This interviewee explained that a citizen suit 
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notice may force MDE to act faster than it would without the notice, but ultimately MDE is 
“not likely to take any action that it wouldn’t have taken anyway.”  
Some	interviewees	observed	that	MDE	is	reluctant	to	allow	citizen	suits	to	proceed.		
The perceived reasons for this stance differed.  Some interviewees expressed a sense 
that	MDE	feels	obligated	to	pursue,	on	its	own,	environmental	violations	brought	
to its attention.  Others suggested an institutional mentality that citizen suits 
embarrass	MDE	because	they	imply	that	MDE	is	not	protecting	public	health	and	
the environment, as is its duty under the law.  
One official observed that traditionally MDE has not viewed citizen suits as a supplement to 
MDE’s enforcement efforts because, from MDE’s perspective, if  the citizen suit identifies 
a violation and that violation is causing an environmental impact, it is MDE’s obligation 
to enforce the law.  This interviewee added, “[MDE] won’t sit by and let citizens take the 
responsibility of  enforcing the law.”  An environmental interviewee said that the options to 
address citizen suits are to “deny the problem, or own the case and take over.”  
Another environmental interviewee expressed a somewhat different interpretation, 
recounting conversations where MDE staff  “said that they can’t let citizens bring lawsuits 
because it gives the perception that they are not doing their job….  They don’t want that 
message out there to lose public support.”  Another described an ingrained mentality at 
MDE that “citizen suits are a threat.”  This combined perception of  embarrassment and 
reputation was echoed by other interviewees, who added that MDE even feels threatened by 
citizen suits. 
Yet another environmental interviewee stated more bluntly, “The number one impediment 
to citizen suits being effective is the hostility [by MDE] to citizen suits.”  Another had the 
impression that MDE has the “erroneous assumption that by going to federal court they 
forgo penalties awarded to the state.”  
Interviewees generally agreed that the regulated community strongly dislikes and 
does not support citizen suits as a means of  enforcement.  Opinions differed, 
however, regarding the impact of  citizen suits on the regulated community’s 
behavior.		
One industry interviewee observed that industry perceives citizen suits as complicating 
compliance because they “make it difficult to work things out.”  Having a citizen group 
at the negotiating table “makes the landscape more difficult,” even if  the regulated 
facility has already agreed to certain actions to come into compliance.  Another industry 
interviewee views citizen suits “with hostility.  There aren’t any citizen groups out there that 
[this industry] would view as working in the joint interest of  [this industry] and the Bay.”  
Another environmental interviewee has the impression that industry views citizen groups as 
“ambulance chasers” and “loose cannons filing lawsuits willy-nilly.”  
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Another industry interviewee said fellow colleagues perceive citizen suits as “witch hunts” 
and are more concerned about “being falsely accused” than they are deterred by the 
potential of  citizen suits.  They are concerned that “a layman would lay blame unnecessarily.” 
This interviewee “would gladly pay more taxes for the police to hand out speeding tickets” 
or analogously “have more MDE people handing out violations” than citizens.  This 
interviewee distinguished between citizen groups that are truly trying to clean up the Bay and 
others that “are just trying to stop growth.”  
A	few	interviewees	cited	the	public	perception	of 	citizen	suits	as	obstacles	to	
enforcement.
One environmental interviewee observed that the public misunderstands the formal legal 
processes behind citizen suits and that the public perception of  citizen suits is framed by 
industry “crying about crazy people and that these actions should be the role of  the state 
instead.”  This interviewee explained that citizen suits work by alleging facts to the best 
of  their knowledge, and “the facts may or may not be correct, but that is how the process 
works….  Motions [in court] would get to the bottom of  the issue.”  
An official acknowledged the public perception of  citizen suits as a “political tool” for 
public interest groups to get membership, raise their profile, or get more donations by filing 
“what you could call frivolous lawsuits.”  Two interviewees refuted this perception.  As one 
environmental interviewee stated, “The truth is, the risk of  losing a citizen suit is so high.  
The only way to file is with pro bono or contingency lawyers.  Groups must pay lots of  fees 
and experts, and possibly the fees of  the defense’s experts.  For small public interest groups, 
a loss could kill them.  They don’t have the luxury of  filing a politically guided case.”  
Regardless	of 	their	view	about	the	use	of 	citizen	suits	in	enforcement	efforts,	
interviewees	agreed	that	citizen	suits	play	a	useful	role	in	bringing	violations	to	
MDE’s	attention	and	educating	the	public	about	both	regulations	and	behavior	
changes.
Many interviewees echoed the sentiment that citizen groups can act as watchdogs and are 
helpful in bringing information to MDE and other state agencies.  A few interviewees noted, 
however, that sometimes citizen groups identify violations that MDE is already pursuing, 
and it would be more helpful for these groups to identify smaller violations that are beyond 
MDE’s resources to monitor.   
The Role of the office of the Maryland Attorney General 
Interviewees	attributed	some	enforcement	problems	to	the	Office	of 	the	Attorney	
General (OAG), citing a lack of  resources and institutional culture.  Other 
interviewees	cited	the	need	for	greater	OAG	review	of 	permits	before	they	are	issued.	
Interviewees had different evaluations of  the OAG.  One industry interviewee said, “The 
Attorney General has done a lot of  enforcement public relations, but they don’t have the 
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resources to carry out their mandate.”  Another official had the impression that lawyers in 
the OAG “don’t like going to court.”  This interviewee criticized the quality of  the legal 
work and found that cases “weren’t always pursued as diligently as they could’ve been.”  
At least two interviewees emphasized the need for the OAG to review permits for legal 
issues before they are issued.  According to one environmental interviewee, “the OAG 
seems surprised when issues of  legality are raised.”  Another environmental interviewee 
commented that if  the OAG is “going to have to defend state decisions, they need to have a 
more active role in reviewing the legality of  permits.”  This interviewee acknowledged that 
the OAG cannot review every permit but that “some are getting through that are clearly 
illegal.”  
This perspective was refuted by one official, who explained that some groups may feel that 
“MDE’s permits aren’t as environmentally protective as they could be, but the permits are 
legally sustainable.  It’s not the OAG’s role to say to MDE, ‘Be tougher.’”  
The Role of Criminal Enforcement
Nearly every participant thought that MDE and the OAG should pursue criminal 
enforcement	actions	when	a	discharger	has	committed	a	willful	or	flagrant	violation	
of  the law.  Opinions as to the effectiveness of  criminal enforcement actions in 
achieving deterrence varied.  Some interviewees said that more criminal actions 
would	send	a	clear	message.		Others	had	difficulty	evaluating	the	deterrent	effect	
of 	such	actions	when	cases	are	so	difficult	to	establish	and	civil	penalties	are	much	
higher than they are in criminal cases.  
Interviewees’ opinions on criminal enforcement actions were fairly similar:   “Criminal action 
should be used in major violations and where there is absolutely no effort to comply, or even 
where there is an effort to comply if  the magnitude of  the violation warrants.”  
However, evaluations of  the current criminal enforcement program differed.  One 
environmental interviewee said, “Currently there is no criminal enforcement to speak of,” 
and the cases brought today are “petty, and no comparison to the caliber of  cases brought 
years ago.”  An industry interviewee disagreed, finding that generally MDE and the OAG do 
a “pretty good job.”  An environmental interviewee echoed this opinion and added that the 
OAG has worked with public interest groups to train them to spot criminal activities.  This 
interviewee added that the OAG seems willing to work with citizens and to bring actions, but 
it is “even more resource-strapped than MDE” and not necessarily lacking in political will.  
Others concurred with the lack of  resources at the Environmental Crimes Unit.  
At least half  of  the interviewees of  different backgrounds agreed that criminal enforcement 
actions should be increased.  However, one industry interviewee feared “that through 
draconian measures, criminal penalties could apply to those that violate out of  ignorance, 
and not flagrant violation of  the rules.”  
Center for Progressive Reform Page 41
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
Other interviewees expressed doubts on the effectiveness of  criminal enforcement.  
“Criminal cases are hard to use to build a deterrence-based program.  Opportunities are 
hard to uncover and require a high level of  proof.”  An industry interviewee added that 
“people have become more sophisticated” and “think they can get away with it,” finding that 
environmental crimes tend to be done by small-time operators, involving lead or asbestos 
removal.  “Big companies do the equation; they don’t want to go to jail.”  An official found it 
difficult to “evaluate the deterrence impact of  a million dollar civil penalty versus a $20,000 
criminal fine.”  
Among those most supportive of  increased criminal enforcement actions were two 
environmental interviewees who said that criminal enforcement actions should make up only 
a small part, perhaps 1 percent, of  enforcement actions.  Others noted additional obstacles 
to establishing successful criminal cases, including the difficulty of  proving criminal intent.  
In addition, “most juries are reluctant to prosecute unless they know that the person was 
aware of  their conduct and had specific intent.”  One environmental interviewee observed 
a reluctance of  state courts to view environmental crimes as the same as other, more typical 
crimes such as robbery.  In one instance, “the judge was very uncomfortable listening to [an 
environmental] case after hearing a case about cigarette theft.”  
The Role of the Environmental Protection Agency
Interviewees	generally	characterized	the	relationship	between	MDE	and	EPA	
as	difficult.		Many	saw	room	for	EPA	to	contribute	to	state	resources	or	to	assist	
with	permit	review,	but	most	agreed	that	MDE	would	push	back	—out	of 	fear	or	
hostility—against	federal	involvement	with	its	enforcement	program.
Interviewees cited similar reasons for MDE and EPA’s difficult relationship, including 
MDE’s concerns about its authority “to make the calls,” its fear that EPA will take away 
its delegation, and its general territoriality over “the sexy cases.”  One environmental 
interviewee characterized the situation as one in which “MDE is afraid to work with EPA on 
greater penalties,” even though the chances of  success are much higher in federal court.  
One industry interviewee “strongly opposed” EPA involvement, citing strong laws in 
Maryland.  This person said, “The folks at MDE live with their constituents—EPA doesn’t.” 
When asked about what role EPA could play, interviewees cited greater oversight, 
consultation, and funding.  Others cited assistance with particular sectors like agriculture and 
stormwater where Maryland “won’t have the ability or political will to do the job.” 
“The folks at MDE 
live with their 
constituents—EPA 
doesn’t,” said 
one industry 
interviewee.
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Recommendations
This report highlights a series of  fundamental weaknesses in the enforcement of  Clean 
Water Act requirements in Maryland.  Foremost is the serious decline in resources over the 
past 10 years, and the ultimate lack of  financial resources to fill all inspector positions at 
MDE and to hire additional enforcement personnel to monitor the nearly 55,000 permits 
in effect.  Even without additional financial resources, however, MDE could nonetheless 
craft an effective enforcement program.  This section offers three sets of  recommendations 
to improve MDE’s enforcement program:  overall recommendations; improvements with 
existing funds; and improvements with additional funds.
overarching Recommendations
Funding
The need for greater funding is clear:  more work is expected of  MDE, but less money is 
given to the agency to do it.  The budget for the WMA enforcement workforce declined by 
25 percent between 2000 and 2009 and the number of  active, full-time inspectors decreased 
by 12 percent while the number of  permits in effect for the entire WMA program tripled.  
Meanwhile, during the interviews, stakeholders from different backgrounds reached a 
surprising consensus, repeatedly citing the need for more inspectors and more inspections 
on the ground.  Environmental groups felt that more inspectors would reveal more 
violations, while industry interviewees felt that more inspectors would reveal that other 
industrial sectors are to blame for ongoing violations and pollution.  Both sides agreed that 
more inspectors are necessary to develop a steady, judicious, systematic, and fair enforcement 
program.  
Increased funding could be obtained from more stringent and well-crafted penalties and 
legislative authorizations for increases in base funding, permitting fees, and penalties.
MDE	should	seek	to	recoup	the	economic	benefit	achieved	by	noncompli-•	
ance from all defendants in an enforcement action. 
Currently, penalty considerations under Maryland law are limited to addressing the 
harm caused by the violation.  However, effective deterrent-based penalties consist 
of  two parts:  one part to address the harm and another to eliminate any economic 
benefit derived by the violator from the violation.  MDE’s failure to recoup this 
latter part effectively undermines the enforcement program’s ability to deter future 
violations, especially considering MDE’s low penalty assessments.  Enforcement 
works when all regulated entities are required to abide by the same laws, and none 
gains a financial advantage by violating those laws.  By simply focusing on recouping 
the cost of  the environmental harm or the cost of  environmental clean up, regulated 
entities may perceive, if  they do not already, penalties as the “cost of  doing busi-
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ness,” deducted from the overall profit.  This result is exactly what the traditional 
“rational actor” model for explaining compliance-related behavior predicts for a 
weak enforcement regime.
EPA’s penalty calculation uses a calculation model called BEN to compute the 
economic benefit to a violator from delaying or avoiding necessary pollution control 
measures.  MDE should apply this or a similar model in its penalty calculations.  
The	Maryland	General	Assembly	should	increase	basic	funding	levels	for	•	
MDE	and	then	index	those	increased	levels	to	the	rate	of 	inflation	to	ensure	
steady funding levels. 
A well-funded enforcement program should have sufficient funds to support a rela-
tively stable amount of  enforcement activities, normal contingencies, and broader 
enforcement objectives and goals.  At best, MDE should have the resources to 
address an increasingly complex and challenging universe of  pollutants.  In MDE’s 
annual enforcement and compliance reports, MDE explains that in certain years 
wet weather events caused a diversion of  resources from one program to another 
so that MDE inspectors could address each overflow report.  A well-funded agency 
should be able to plan for normal contingencies without having to stretch resources 
so thinly. 
The	Maryland	General	Assembly	should	authorize	an	increase	in	permitting	•	
fees	to	ensure	that	the	fees	cover	the	basic	cost	of 	program	administration.		
The legislature should also authorize increased penalties for violations and 
should	establish	mandatory	minimum	penalties	that	are	not	subject	to	MDE	
discretion.
In 2007, the Transition report found that more than two-thirds of  the permit and 
license fees charged by each department have not been increased in more than 10 
years.  Discharge permit fees in Maryland should be “based on the anticipated cost 
of  program activities related to management of  discharge to waters of  this State.”  
For example, the fees for a surface water discharge permit were last raised in 1993.  
At the very least, permit fees could be raised in accordance with inflation rates since 
1993.  
Similarly, maximum civil and administrative penalties in Maryland could also be 
adjusted for inflation as the EPA has done.  Table 1 shows that EPA’s maximum civil 
penalty is now $37,500, whereas Maryland’s maximum penalty for CWA violations is 
$10,000, the level at which it was enacted.
Both governmental and environmental interviewees complained repeatedly that 
MDE and state court judges have too much discretion in determining the size of  
penalties, resulting in low penalties that have little deterrent impact.  One govern-
mental interviewee cited an example of  a criminal enforcement action in which the 
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state court judge gave the defendant a $20 fine.  Overall, the low average penalty 
amounts indicate that MDE and the OAG are seeking or settling for low penalties.  
One way to address this problem is for the Maryland legislature to establish a man-
datory minimum penalty (MMP).  A report by the Texas Public Interest Research 
Group found that MMPs were effective enforcement tools, contributing in New 
Jersey to 87-percent and 50-percent decreases, respectively, in pollution discharge 
violations and reporting violations.  Effective MMPs are characterized by clear defi-
nitions of  all CWA violations, including pollution discharge and reporting violations; 
penalty levels that deter the wealthiest polluters but are fair to small businesses; au-
thorizations for delegated authorities to assess penalties; and prompt assessment and 
prompt payment.  For example, New Jersey’s MMP classifies dischargers as either 
“serious violators” or “significant non-compliers,” and the mandatory minimum 
is $1,000 and $5,000, respectively.  Reporting violations are $100 per day for each 
omission, with a maximum penalty of  $50,000 per month.  
Enforcement Program Design
As discussed earlier, an effective enforcement program may combine both cooperative and 
deterrence-based approaches, but ultimately the deterrence-based component appears to 
effect the most compliance with CWA and state water quality laws.  A deterrence-based 
enforcement program consists of  four essential elements:  compliance monitoring, timely 
initiation of  enforcement actions; a mandate to comply; and imposition of  adequate 
penalties.  Both the data review of  MDE’s annual enforcement and compliance reports and 
the interviews for this report revealed that MDE’s enforcement program falls short of  an 
effective program design.  
MDE must stop relying on paper reviews of  DMRs as the primary way to set •	
priorities for physical, on-site inspections.  
Many interviewees with different interests expressed the need for more inspectors 
and more on-site inspections than MDE currently conducts.  At least two officials 
pointed out the problem with relying on DMRs:  “you have to trust what you get” 
but “there are too many incidents of  fraudulent DMRs.  Inspectors find visible vio-
lations.”  MDE’s Compliance Program explicitly notes its reliance on DMR reviews.
MDE currently prioritizes permittees based on their risk to the environment and 
human health and ranks them according to factors such as the nature of  the opera-
tion, compliance history, and location of  the facility.  High-risk permittees are more 
likely to be physically inspected.  However, MDE should establish an enforcement 
program with routine inspections for as many permittees as possible.
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If  MDE continues to rely heavily on paper reviews, it should assess stiff  penalties 
for reporting violations so that regulated entities have every incentive to truthfully 
report pollutant discharges. 
MDE	and	the	OAG	should	ensure	that	permits	are	legally	defensible	and	•	
meet the statutorily required standards of  protectiveness.  MDE should also 
clarify the extent to which the permit defense shield applies in Maryland.  
Enforcement of  CWA requirements starts, most basically, with the NPDES pollu-
tion discharge permit issued to each regulated entity.  Clearly written permits benefit 
all stakeholders: the regulated entity, by clearly stating what is and is not permitted, 
and the public, by establishing clear standards by which to judge a violation.  Unfor-
tunately, during the interviews, a common complaint that emerged was that MDE 
issues permits that are unclear and confusing or that fail to meet minimum legal 
requirements.  Because MDE’s legal counsel will eventually be required to defend 
the permits, the OAG should take a greater role in reviewing permits before they 
are issued.  This preemptive action may reduce the resources later needed to defend 
permits or prosecute permit violations.  As one environmental interviewee noted, 
“It doesn’t cost any more to write a good permit than a bad one!”  
In addition, MDE should clarify the extent of  the permit shield defense as it applies 
in Maryland.  Among the possible options, MDE could identify key pollutants that 
it identifies as harmful and set permit limits for discharges of  those pollutants above 
certain amounts.  This approach would divest permit-issuing officials of  some dis-
cretion to determine which pollutants merit limits, but it would relieve the agency of  
the responsibility of  deciding on a case-by-case basis which pollutants are sufficient-
ly harmful to require limits.  It would also provide a baseline level of  permit controls 
needed to protect the state’s aquatic ecosystems.  Alternatively, MDE could identify 
key pollutants and require permit applicants to disclose in their permits applica-
tions the amounts of  those pollutants they plan to discharge.  Such disclosure would 
allow MDE to use its informed discretion to determine whether to impose limits 
and, if  so, what those limits should be.  Discharge of  a listed pollutant without prior 
disclosure in the permit would constitute a violation, and perhaps even trigger the 
severe penalties that MDE invokes for willful violations.  
The	Maryland	General	Assembly	should	increase	maximum	penalty	amounts	•	
for violations of  CWA NPDES permits.
Currently, the Clean Water Act authorizes a maximum civil penalty of  $37,500 for 
NPDES violations, whereas Maryland law authorizes a maximum civil penalty of  
$10,000 for the same violations.  The General Assembly should authorize a maxi-
mum civil penalty that is comparable to the federal maximum.  
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MDE should not settle for penalties that fail to deter dischargers from violat-•	
ing	the	applicable	laws	and	regulations.	
As noted earlier, between 2000 and 2009 MDE’s average penalty settlement was 
far below the maximum amount authorized under the CWA and Maryland law.  
Coupled with the relative paucity of  inspections, dischargers in Maryland have little 
reason to think that they will be caught and, even if  caught, that they will be mean-
ingfully penalized.  
MDE	should	reevaluate	the	balance	of 	judicial	enforcement	actions	and	•	
administrative enforcement actions and carefully consider which route is 
better,	based	on	factors	such	as	the	difference	in	maximum	available	penal-
ties or past experience with similar cases or in similar venues.  MDE should 
also consider allowing citizen suits to proceed in federal court to maximize 
penalty recovery and the deterrent effect from strong penalties.  
During the interviews, both officials and environmental interviewees described their 
perceptions of  a strong bias in favor of  defendants in state courts and the difficulty 
of  obtaining a fair trial.  MDE should consider this bias when deciding what type of  
enforcement action to pursue, either in state court or through the Maryland Office 
of  Administrative Hearings.  MDE should also consider this bias in conjunction 
with whether to over-file citizen suits or to let them proceed in federal court.  
MDE should provide complete information in its annual enforcement and •	
compliance	reports	that	is	necessary	for	the	public	to	assess	the	scope	and	
effectiveness of  the agency’s enforcement program.
While the annual Enforcement and Compliance Reports provide great insight into 
MDE’s enforcement program, the reports could be improved by ensuring consistent 
counting methods and including all enforcement activities.  Consistent counting 
methods would allow the public to fairly compare MDE’s enforcement efforts in 
different years.  Including all enforcement activities would allow the public to see 
what additional measures are being taken to ensure compliance with the CWA and 
may even benefit MDE by revealing a great deal more enforcement than currently 
appears in the available data.  At a minimum, this information would give a more de-
tailed and holistic view of  all enforcement efforts in Maryland.  For example, MDE 
could include: 
Information on SEPs, including monitoring efforts and evaluations on their • 
effectiveness; 
Information on repeat violations at previously cited facilities or repeat viola-• 
tors; and
Information on enforcement activities undertaken by locally delegated au-• 
thorities. 
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Citizen Suits 
Citizen suits are an integral and established part of  most federal environmental laws and 
enforcement programs.  They represent an explicit congressional recognition that citizens 
have a role to play in enforcement because they and their organizations are able and have 
information and resources to monitor local dischargers that MDE may not.  MDE seems to 
afford inadequate weight to the use of  citizen suits as a tool to supplement enforcement. 
MDE	should	permit,	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	citizen	suits	to	proceed	in	fed-•	
eral	court	as	an	established	supplementary	enforcement	mechanism.		MDE	
should also work with citizens groups and EPA to channel cases through 
federal court to get higher penalties where appropriate.
In determining whether or not to over-file citizen suits—thus effectively preventing 
them from proceeding—MDE should consider a variety of  factors, including:  the 
availability of  resources to pursue a violation alleged in a citizen suit; whether or 
not active enforcement action has already been commenced by MDE, or whether 
the suit prompts initiation of  an enforcement action; the nature and profile of  the 
alleged violator; whether allowing the suit to proceed in federal court may be better 
than an action by MDE in state court; and the availability of  relief  or penalty recov-
ery.  
MDE retains every right to preempt citizen suits that are brought to its attention by 
initiating and diligently prosecuting its own enforcement actions.  However, many 
environmental interviewees expressed frustration with the inability to pursue any 
federal actions and the inability to participate as an intervener in subsequent MDE 
actions.  
improvements with Existing Limited Resources
This report confirms a longstanding problem with MDE’s lack of  resources and its impact 
on enforcement.  Clearly, as recommended above, MDE’s enforcement program would 
improve dramatically with adequate numbers of  inspectors and more on-site inspections, but 
MDE can also make a number of  improvements even if  resources do not increase.   
MDE	should	conduct	an	analysis	of 	the	most	significant	causes	of 	Bay	pol-•	
lution	and	select	and	inspect	on	an	annual	basis	the	largest	dischargers	or	a	
random sample of  discharges in sectors with multiple small dischargers.  
Paper reviews of  DMRs are an important part of  any enforcement program, but 
on-site inspections are crucial.  They reveal violations that are omitted, not evident, 
or concealed in self-reports and enable MDE to better and realistically understand 
what actions to enhance compliance are and are not being taken by regulated enti-
ties.  As part of  a targeted, focused enforcement program, MDE should also pursue 
a small number of  cases to the hilt. 
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MDE should develop and clearly communicate its enforcement priorities to •	
the	regulated	community	and	to	the	public	and	widely	and	publicly	advertise	
successful, tough enforcement actions.
One of  the most important actions MDE and the political leadership in Maryland 
can take is to throw its support behind a strong, vigorous enforcement program.  
Especially in times when budgets are tight, political support is a powerful resource 
that can help maintain the morale of  the enforcement staff  and communicate to the 
regulated community that violations will be pursued.  
While MDE advertises its enforcement actions on its website, the agency should 
try to reach a wider public audience by reaching out to local media for coverage of  
enforcement actions in the relevant local newspapers and broadcast outlets.  
Internally, MDE should foster a culture that is supportive of  enforcement. •	
MDE, like all enforcement authorities, often occupies an unenviable position:  the 
middle.  It may receive pressure from the political leadership or other state agen-
cies to pursue or ignore certain cases or sectors; it must interact frequently with the 
regulated community, which has its own interests in enforcement; and it is the focal 
point of  frustration from vigilant and vocal environmental organizations.  Given 
those pressures and the bleak budget situation, it is not difficult to imagine that 
MDE’s enforcement workforce is beleaguered, demoralized, and reluctant to take a 
step in any direction for fear of  drawing the ire of  some stakeholder.  
To foster an internal agency culture that emphasizes enforcement, MDE leadership 
should continue to demonstrate in words and action that it is committed to enforc-
ing the Clean Water Act as written and intended by Congress.  In addition, MDE 
is filled with committed, dedicated, and professional enforcement staff, many of  
whom could take stronger leadership roles in enforcement and advocate for more 
stringent penalties or enforcement actions.  MDE should encourage its enforcement 
personnel to take on this role.  MDE should also provide incentives to maintain 
staff  morale, including higher pay grades, promotions, and opportunities for con-
tinuing professional or advanced education.  
improvements with Additional Funds
MDE’s enforcement program could be better funded if  it followed the model of  the most 
advanced federal programs, which tend to be more aggressive about collecting penalties 
that are then channeled back into enforcement.  An annual budget appropriation from the 
Maryland legislature is still necessary to provide the foundation of  the program, but an 
effective restructuring of  the enforcement program could render it self-supporting.  With 
more financial resources, MDE could increase its enforcement program in a number of  
ways: 
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MDE	should	inspect	at	the	frequency	specified	by	Maryland	law	and	EPA	•	
guidelines.
In 2007, EPA issued inspection frequency goals for the core NPDES programs, as 
well as wet weather sources of  pollutant discharges.10 For example, as MDE begins 
to develop an enforcement program for the new CAFO permit, it should note that 
EPA guidelines recommend a 20-percent inspection coverage rate for large CAFOs, 
or an inspection at least once every five years.  For construction sites, the guidance 
recommends a 10-percent inspection rate for sites larger than five acres and a 5-per-
cent inspection rate for sites between one and five acres.  MDE’s existing annual 
reports do not break down inspection information this specifically, so it cannot be 
determined if  MDE is meeting these goals.  
In addition, Maryland law specifies some inspection frequencies.  Under Maryland 
law construction sites with approved erosion and sediment control plans must be 
inspected on the average of  every two weeks.  MDE’s annual reports freely concede 
inadequate inspections.  With additional financial resources, MDE should strive to 
meet EPA’s and its own goals for inspection frequencies.  
MDE	should	address	as	many	violations	as	possible	with	formal	civil	and	•	
criminal enforcement actions.
The nature of  the enforcement actions, deterrent-based or cooperative, impacts the 
overall effectiveness of  any enforcement program.  The rational regulated entity 
model appears to support the conclusion that deterrence-based actions are more 
likely to ensure lasting and long-term compliance than would result from primary 
reliance on cooperative-based enforcement tools.  However, MDE should also 
consider the nature of  the violation in determining which enforcement approach 
to apply.  First-time violators that self-report violations, for example, may warrant a 
cooperative enforcement approach, while repeat or willful first-time violators should 
be subject to a strong deterrence-based approach.  
The OAG should increase its staff  seated at MDE to process enforcement •	
actions in a timely manner.
As of  March 2010, MDE is represented by a staff  of  24 attorneys from the OAG.  
These attorneys are responsible for an enormous amount of  cases.  While these 
attorneys report to the Attorney General, their positions are located within MDE’s 
budget.  With additional funding, MDE should allocate a larger portion of  its bud-
get to hire the additional staff  necessary to meet the enforcement caseload.
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MDE should reach out to citizens who live near regulated facilities to encour-•	
age and educate them to monitor instances of  noncompliance.   
With more funding, MDE could enlist citizens to assist with compliance monitor-
ing by teaching them how to identify violations to bring to MDE’s attention.  One 
environmental interviewee commended past efforts by the Environmental Crimes 
Unit to reach out to citizens groups in this way.  MDE could extend and broaden 
this outreach to assist with its monitoring efforts.  
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Future Research
This report provides a detailed look at MDE’s enforcement program for CWA requirements. 
However, many other questions remain unanswered and would benefit from future research, 
including:
The average caseload for an inspector or legal counsel.•	   This report identifies 
an average 1,184 permits in effect per inspector in the WMA and approximately 24 
staff  attorneys seated at MDE.  It is unclear, however, what a reasonable caseload 
for either an inspector or an attorney would be.  In California, Delaware, Illinois, 
and North Carolina, the average number of  permits per inspector is 120.  How-
ever, it is difficult to compare this number with MDE because in those states the 
enforcement data are specific to NPDES permits only, whereas MDE’s information 
represents the entire WMA program.  
The trigger for an onsite inspection.•	   With limited resources, MDE can only in-
spect a limited number of  facilities and permittees.  It would be useful to understand 
how MDE selects sites for onsite inspections.  
The	amount	of 	money	lost	from	not	recovering	the	violator’s	benefit	from	•	
noncompliance.  EPA’s penalty policy includes a calculation to recover the viola-
tor’s economic benefit from noncompliance, which MDE does not include.  The 
failure to recover this benefit undermines effective deterrence.  An illuminating 
future research question may be to attempt to calculate the amount lost by failure to 
recover this benefit over the past decade.
The	number	of 	citizen	suits	overfiled.•	   MDE should release information about 
how many citizen suits it has overfiled, and the outcome of  those cases compared to 
what the citizen suits sought.  This information could help determine if  and when 
MDE should simply allow citizen suits to proceed to maximize penalty recovery and 
deterrent effect.  
The	number	of 	facilities	that,	after	notice	of 	a	violation,	come	into	compli-•	
ance within 60 days.  This information would indicate in part the effectiveness 
of  MDE’s enforcement program as a reflection of  how seriously a facility regards 
potential formal enforcement action.
The	enforcement	activities	conducted	by	locally	delegated	authorities.	•	  Al-
though including these activities is a recommendation made in the report, it is worth 
reemphasizing the need for this information and conducting an analysis of  these 
enforcement activities.  The bulk of  pretreatment programs are delegated to local 
governments, which may be more easily influenced by economically powerful inter-
ests and thus have less incentive to enforce strictly against polluters.  
The enforcement programs in other Bay States.•	   While Maryland has a signifi-
cant role to play in Bay restoration, the other Bay States, especially Pennsylvania and 
Virginia, contribute significant amounts of  pollution as well.  An important area of  
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future research, therefore, would be to conduct similar evaluations of  the enforce-
ment programs in those states.
Center for Progressive Reform Page 53
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
Conclusion
Maryland has long prided itself  on being an environmental leader in the Chesapeake 
Bay region, but that pride must come under scrutiny in light of  MDE’s enforcement 
program.  While it is crucial for legislatures and agencies to adopt sufficiently protective 
environmental laws, those laws will have little impact if  they are not vigorously enforced.  
MDE’s enforcement efforts are squeezed to the edge of  ineffectiveness by an increasingly 
tight budget and a poorly designed program that fails to maximize its deterrent impact.  
When inspectors are scarce and on-site inspections even scarcer, the regulated community 
internalizes a cavalier attitude that violations will not be discovered.  Even if  they are 
discovered, violators can rest assured that penalties will likely remain low.  From the outset, 
these two important components of  an effective deterrence-based enforcement program—
consistent monitoring and deterrent penalties—are undermined.  Worse, citizen suits are 
unable to backstop deficiencies in the government’s enforcementa program as a result of  
MDE’s reluctance—if  not outright hostility—to allowing these suits to proceed.
While MDE’s budget woes are pervasive, MDE can still muster the political resources to 
redesign its enforcement program on a limited budget.  Strong leadership, dedicated focus 
to certain sectors, and tougher penalties are all steps that do not require additional resources.  
If  the goal is cleaner waters in Maryland and ultimately a restored Chesapeake Bay, the 
Maryland Department of  the Environment must forcefully and publicly rededicate its 
commitment to enforcement.
Page 54 Center for Progressive Reform
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
1 GAO Report, GAO-10-165T, Clean Water Act:  
Longstanding Issues Impact EPA’s and States’ Enforcement 
Efforts (Oct. 2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10165t.pdf.
2  GAO Report, GAO-07-883, EPA-State Enforcement 
Partnership Has Improved, but EPA’s Oversight Needs Further 
Enhancement (July 2007), http: //www.gao.gov/new.items/
d07883.pdf.
3  The citizen suit provisions also authorize suits against 
EPA for failure to fulfill its nondiscretionary statutory 
duties.  This aspect of  the citizen suit provision is not the 
focus of  this report.
4 33 U.C.S. § 1365 (2010). 
5  James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in 
Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 Widener L. rev. 1, 30 
(2003).
6  Id. 
7  Without separating these forms of  inspection, the 
inspection coverage rates would have been 21 percent and 
13 percent, respectively, for FY 2008 and FY 2009.
8  Maryland Department of  Environment, FY 2008 Annual 
Enforcement and Compliance Report 18 (2009), http://
www.mde.state.md.us/assets/document/AboutMDE/
enf_comp_08.pdf. 
9  New York v. U.S. E.P.A., 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
10  EPA Office of  Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, 
The Clean Water Act NPDES Compliance Monitoring Strategy 
for the Core Program and Wet Weather Sources (October 2007), 
http:// www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/
monitoring/cwa/npdescms.pdf.
Endnotes
Center for Progressive Reform Page 55
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
online Reports and Resources
Maryland Transition Work Group, Report on Environment 
and Natural Resources (2007), http://www.gov.state.
md.us/documents/transition/Environment.pdf.  
University of  Maryland Environmental Law Clinic, Keeping 
Pace:  An Evaluation of  Maryland’s Most Important 
Environmental Problems and What We Can Do to Solve 
Them (2002), http://www.law.umaryland.edu/programs/
environment/documents/frosh-report.pdf.  
Maryland Department of  the Environment, Annual 
Enforcement and Compliance Reports (2000-2009), 
http://www.mde.state.md.us/AboutMDE/Reports/
enforcementComp.asp.  
Maryland Departments of  the Environment and Natural 
Resources, The 2008 Integrated Report of  Surface Water 
Quality in Maryland, http://www.mde.state.md.us/assets/
document/2008_IR_Parts_A_thru_E(1).pdf.  
Letter from Maryland Departments of  Environment and 
Agriculture to Maryland Poultry Grower (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://www.mde.state.md.us/assets/document/MDE_
and_MDA_AFO_Farmer_Letter.pdf  
Maryland Office of  Legislative Audit, Audit Report:  
Maryland Department of  the Environment (Jan. 
2008), http://www.ola.state.md.us/Reports/Fiscal%20
Compliance/Environ08.pdf.
Analysis of  the FY 2011 Maryland Executive Budget, 2010, 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2010rs/budget_docs/
all/Operating/C81C_-_Office_of_the_Attorney_
General.pdf.   
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, NPDES Compliance 
Monitoring Website, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
monitoring/programs/cwa/npdes.html (last visited Mar. 
5, 2010).  
Memorandum on Clean Water Act National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System Compliance Monitoring 
Strategy for the Core Program and Wet Weather 
Sources (Oct. 17, 2007), available at http://www.epa.
gov/compliance/resources/policies/monitoring/cwa/
npdescms.pdf.  
U.S. EPA, FY08-FY10 Compliance and Enforcement 
National Priority: Clean Water Act, Wet Weather, 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) 
(Oct. 2007), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
resources/publications/data/planning/priorities/
fy2008prioritycwacafo.pdf.  
U.S. EPA Office of  Enforcement and Compliance 
Assistance, Clean Water Act Enforcement Action Plan 
(Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/civil/
cwa/actionplan/actionplan101409.pdf. 
U.S. EPA, Chesapeake Bay Program, Bay Barometer:  A 
Health and Restoration Assessment of  the Chesapeake 
Bay and Watershed in 2008 (Mar. 2009), http://www.
chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_34915.pdf.  
H. Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, Stagnant 
Waters: The Legacy of  the Bush Administration on the 
Clean Water Act (Oct. 18, 2008), http://transportation.
house.gov/Media/File/press/Stagnant%20Waters-%20
2008%20Clean%20Water%20Act%20Report.pdf.   
Memorandum on the Decline of  Clean Water Act 
Enforcement Program (Dec. 16, 2008), http://oversight.
house.gov/images/stories/documents/20081216113810.
pdf.
Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-883, EPA-State 
Enforcement Partnership Has Improved, but EPA’s 
Oversight Needs Further Enhancement (July 2007), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07883.pdf.  
GAO Report, GAO-10-165T, Clean Water Act:  
Longstanding Issues Impact EPA’s and States’ 
Enforcement Efforts (Oct. 2009), http: //www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10165t.pdf.
Environment Maryland Research & Policy Center, Wasting 
Our Waterways: Toxic Industrial Pollution and the 
Unfulfilled Promise of  the Clean Water Act (Fall 2009), 
http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/8bad665de
4d6d8f296a81389290b643d/Wasting-Our-Waterways---
Report---Environment-Maryland.pdf/.  
William Coyne and Luke Metzger, TexPIRG Education 
Fund, Mandatory Minimum Penalties: An Effective 
Tool for Enforcement of  Clean Water Laws 
(2004), http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/
assets/9JAd5LuwrDPZLiK81r3j_Q/Mandatory_
Minimum_Penalties.pdf.
Karen Hosler, Tougher Policing of  Water Quality Needed, 
Balt. Sun, Jan. 11, 2010.  
Natalie Neumann, Eastern Shore Legislators say “Inflexible” 
Environment Department Hurting Job Growth, 
Maryland Reporter, Feb. 14, 2010, available at http://
www.marylandreporter.com/page5503040.aspx.
Timothy B. Wheeler, Chicken Farm Bars Pollution Tests, Md. 
Says, Balt. Sun, Jan. 19, 2010, at 2A.
Law Reviews
William L. Andreen, Motivating Enforcement: Institutional 
Culture and the Clean Water Act, 24 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 
67 (2007).
David R. Hodas, Enforcement of  Environmental Law in a 
Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd 
When Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United 
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 Md. L. Rev. 
1552 (1995).  
References
Page 56 Center for Progressive Reform
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
Robert Glicksman and Dale Earnhart, The Comparative 
Effectiveness of  Government Interventions on 
Environmental Performance in the Chemical Industry, 26 
Stanford Envtl. L.J. 317 (2007).
Robert Glicksman and Dale Earnhart, Depiction of  the 
Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship in the Chemical 
Industry:  Deterrence-Based v. Cooperative Enforcement, 
31 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 603 (2007)
David L. Markell, The Role of  Deterrence-Based 
Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal 
Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2000).  
David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research 
to Design Government Citizen Participation Processes: 
A Case Study of  Citizens’ Roles in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1 
(2008).
James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in 
Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 Widener L. Rev. 1 
(2003).  
Jeffrey G. Miller, Overlooked Issues in the “Diligent 
Prosecution” Citizen Suit Preclusion, 10 Widener L. Rev. 
63 (2003).  
Joel A. Mintz, Scrutinizing Environmental Enforcement: 
A Comment on a Recent Discussion at the AALS, 27 J. 
Land Use & Envtl. Law 127 (2001).
Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory 
Preclusions Against Successive Environmental 
Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, Part One: 
Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 Harv. Envtl. 
L. Rev. 401 (2004).  
Jessica Owley, Piney Run: The Permits are not What They 
Seem, 30 Eco. L.Q. 429 (2003).  
Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in 
the Twenty-First Century: Harnessing the Power of  the 
Public Spotlight, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 775 (2004).
Daniel Riesel, Citizen Suits in the New Millennium, SN044 
ALI-ABA 255 (Feb. 6-8, 2008).
Ronald H. Rosenberg, Doing More or Doing Less for the 
Environment: Shedding Light on EPA’s Stealth Method 
of  Environmental Enforcement, 35 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. 
Rev. 175 (2008).
Laws, Regulations, and Cases
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251 et. seq. (2010).  
40 C.F.R. §19.4 (2009).  
Md. Envir. Code §§1-301(d) & 4-417 (2010).  
Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. County Comm’rs of  Carroll County, 
268 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001).  
New York v. U.S. E.P.A., 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
Citizens Petition by the Waterkeepers of  Maryland and 
Waterkeeper Alliance for the Withdrawal of  the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program 
Delegation from the State of  Maryland (Dec. 9, 2009), 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/programs/environment/
documents/NPDES_petition.pdf.  
Center for Progressive Reform Page 57
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
About the Authors
Robert	L.	Glicksman is the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor 
of  Environmental Law at the George Washington University School 
of  Law.  He is a nationally and internationally recognized expert 
on environmental, natural resources, and administrative law issues.  
Professor Glicksman previously taught at the University of  Kansas 
School of  Law, where he was the Robert W. Wagstaff  Distinguished 
Professor of  Law.  He is the author of  two casebooks on environmental, 
natural resources, and administrative law; and dozens of  articles and 
book chapters on these topics.  Professor Glicksman’s recent research 
on Clean Water Act enforcement includes three co-authored law review articles and an 
upcoming book on enforcement of  the Clean Water Act nationwide, Pollution Limits 
and Polluters’ Efforts to Comply:  The Role of  Government Monitoring and Enforcement (Stanford 
University Press) (with Dietrich Earnhart). 
Yee	Huang is a Policy Analyst with the Center for Progressive Reform.  
She graduated cum laude from Rice University with a B.A. in biology and 
received a Rotary Ambassadorial Scholarship to study international law 
at the University of  Kent in Brussels, Belgium, where she received an 
L.L.M. with distinction.  Ms. Huang received her J.D. cum laude from the 
University of  Florida Levin College of  Law.  During law school, she 
published articles in the University of  Denver Water Law Review, the Florida 
Journal of  International Law, and the Cardozo Law Review.  
Page 58 Center for Progressive Reform
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
Appendix A: Response from MDE
Center for Progressive Reform Page 59
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
Page 60 Center for Progressive Reform
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
Center for Progressive Reform Page 61
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
Appendix B: Response from CPR
Page 62 Center for Progressive Reform
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
Center for Progressive Reform Page 63
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
Appendix C: MDE Rebuttal
Page 64 Center for Progressive Reform
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
To see more of CPR’s work or to contribute, 
visit CPR’s website at www.progressivereform.org.
455 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
# 150-513
Washington, DC 20001
202-747-0698 (phone/fax)
RETURN UNDELIVERABLES TO:
Center for Progressive Reform
455 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
# 150-513
Washington, DC 20001
 
